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Abstract
We introduce a simple benchmark model of dynamic matching in networked mar-
kets, where agents arrive and depart stochastically and the network of acceptable trans-
actions among agents forms a random graph. We analyze our model from three per-
spectives: waiting, optimization, and information. The main insight of our analysis
is that waiting to thicken the market can be substantially more important than in-
creasing the speed of transactions, and this is quite robust to the presence of waiting
costs. From an optimization perspective, na¨ıve local algorithms, that choose the right
time to match agents but do not exploit global network structure, can perform very
close to optimal algorithms. From an information perspective, algorithms that em-
ploy even partial information on agents’ departure times perform substantially better
than those that lack such information. To elicit agents’ departure times, we design an
incentive-compatible continuous-time dynamic mechanism without transfers.
Keywords: Market Design, Matching, Networks, Continuous-time Markov Chains, Mechanism Design
JEL Classification Numbers: D47, C78, C60
∗We thank Paul Milgrom and Alvin Roth for valuable comments and suggestions. We also thank Itai
Ashlagi, Timothy Bresnahan, Gabriel Carroll, Fuhito Kojima, Matthew Jackson, Muriel Niederle, Afshin
Nikzad, Malwina Luczak, Michael Ostrovsky, Bob Wilson, and Alex Wolitzky for their valuable comments,
as well as several seminar participants for helpful suggestions. All errors remain our own.
†Department of Economics, Stanford University. Email: mohamwad@stanford.edu
‡Department of Economics, Stanford University. Email: shengwu@stanford.edu
§Computer Science Division, U.C. Berkeley. Supported by a Miller fellowship. Email: oveisgharan@
berkeley.edu
ar
X
iv
:1
40
2.
36
43
v1
  [
cs
.G
T]
  1
5 F
eb
 20
14
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 The Model 6
3 Our Contributions 10
3.1 Value of Waiting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
3.2 Value of Optimization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.3 Welfare Under Discounting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
3.4 Value of Information and Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms . . . . . . . . . 17
3.5 Technical Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
4 Performance of the Optimum Solutions 19
4.1 Loss of the Optimum Online Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4.2 Loss of the Omniscient Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
5 Modeling an Online Algorithm as a Markov Chain 22
5.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
5.2 Markov Chain Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.3 Stationary Distributions: Existence and Uniqueness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.4 Upper bounding the Mixing Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4.1 Mixing time of the Greedy Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
5.4.2 Mixing time of the Patient Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6 Performance Analysis 28
6.1 Loss of the Greedy Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.2 Loss of the Patient Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
6.3 Loss of the Patient(α) Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
7 Welfare Analysis 41
7.1 Welfare of the Patient Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7.2 Welfare of the Greedy Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
8 Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms 44
9 Concluding Remarks 50
A Auxiliary Inequalities 54
1 Introduction
Economics has extensively studied the problem of matching in static settings (see [GS62,
CK81, KJC82, RS92, RSU¨04, HM05, RSU¨07, HK10]). In such settings, a social planner
observes the set of agents, and their preferences over partners, or contracts, or sets thereof.
The planner’s problem is to find a matching algorithm with desirable properties; e.g. sta-
bility, efficiency, or strategy-proofness. The algorithm is run, the matching is made, and
the world ends. Some seasonal markets, such as school choice systems and the National
Residencies Matching Program, are appropriately conceived as static assignment problems
without inter-temporal spillovers.
There has been comparatively little study of dynamic matching, viz. the problem of
finding good algorithms for matching markets that evolve over time, where the planner must
make allocations in the present while facing an uncertain future. In such markets, agents
arrive at different times, with needs that may be fulfilled by an appropriate transaction
brokered by a social planner. If their needs are not met, they may depart or their needs may
expire, removing the possibility of a future transaction. Stochastic arrivals and departures
are an institutional feature of many real world marketplaces. Some natural examples are:
• Kidney exchange: In paired kidney exchanges, patient-donor pairs arrive gradually
over time. They stay in the market to find a compatible pair, and may leave the market
if the patient’s condition deteriorates to the point where kidney transplants become
infeasible.
• Real estate markets: In real estate markets, agents (buyers and sellers) arrive at the
market non-simultaneously, trying to rent/buy a property with certain characteristics,
or to find a renter with certain characteristics. The central broker (say, a real estate
agent) has substantial information about buyers and sellers’ characteristics. Potential
landlords and potential renters may leave the market if, for example, they find a gainful
trade elsewhere.
• Allocation of workers to time-sensitive tasks: Both within firms, and in on-
line labor markets such as oDesk, planners have to allocate workers to tasks that are
profitable to undertake. Tasks arrive continuously, and different workers are suited to
different tasks. Tasks may expire, and workers may cease to be available.
In static matching markets, such as the canonical stable marriage problem introduced
by Gale and Shapley [GS62], the social planner solves a one-time problem by choosing
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s1 b1
Market at time t0
s1 b1
s2 b2
Market at time t0 + 1
Figure 1: A schematic real estate market, where there is a line between a seller and a buyer if
and only if they are mutually interested in trade. In a static setting at time t0, the optimum
solution matches s1 to b1. But in a dynamic setting a new seller and a new buyer may arrive
at the market in the next period, so the planner can wait and obtain a better solution by
matching s1 to b2 and s2 to b1.
which agents to match. In contrast, in a dynamic setting, the passage of time brings new
possibilities for transactions and extinguishes existing possibilities. For example, as shown
in Figure 1, the planner can match s1 to b1 at time t0, but then he cannot match s2 and b2
in the next period. In contrast, if he waits and postpones matching agents for one period, he
can match s1 to b2 and s2 to b1, which is a better solution. Hence, in a dynamic setting, the
social planner confronts a new question: “When should agents be matched?” The first goal
of this paper is to answer this question. One might think that this is a second-order question,
in the sense that, as in the static setting, the first-order question for a social planner is which
agents to match. The second goal of this paper is to compare the relative importance of these
two questions. This helps us to think systematically about the trade-offs policymakers face
in settings where the timing of transactions is a design parameter, rather than an exogenous
constraint.
In this paper, we analyze a stylized but illuminating model of dynamic matching on
networks. In our model, agents arrive at the market according to Poisson processes, and
remain in the market for an interval drawn from an exponential distribution. Abstracting
from prices, our model uses simple preferences, where transactions between agents are either
acceptable or unacceptable, generated according to a known distribution. The network
of acceptable transactions forms (under certain conditions) an Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph.
Agents do not observe the set of acceptable transactions, and are reliant upon the planner to
match them to each other. We say that an agent perishes if she leaves the market unmatched.
The planner’s problem is to design a matching algorithm; that is, at any point in time,
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to select a subset of acceptable transactions and broker those trades. The planner observes
the current set of agents and acceptable transactions, but has only probabilistic knowledge
about the future. The planner may have knowledge about which agents’ needs are urgent,
in the sense that he may know which agents will perish imminently if not matched. The
goal of the planner is to maximize the sum of the discounted utilities of all agents. In the
important special case where the cost of waiting is zero, the planner’s goal is equivalent to
minimizing the proportion of agents who perish.
We design two simple matching algorithms and a class of interpolating algorithms. The
Greedy Algorithm attempts to match each agent upon her arrival; it treats each instant as
a static matching problem without regard for the future. The Patient Algorithm attempts
to match only urgent cases. The Patient(α) Algorithm, is a class of variants of the Patient
algorithm with a smaller average waiting time determined by a parameter α ≥ 0. This
class is specifically appealing when dealing with discounting. All these algorithms are local,
in the sense that they look only at the immediate neighbors of agents rather than at the
global graph structure. We compare the performance of these algorithms with two optimal
benchmarks, one that has unlimited computational power and one that has perfect foresight.
We first consider the case of perfectly patient agents, and then show that our results are
not substantially altered by discounting. Our results are as follows: First, we show that
waiting to thicken the market can dramatically reduce the rate of perishing compared to
‘optimal static’ policies. In particular, the fraction of perished agents under the Patient
algorithm is exponentially smaller (in the average degree of agents) than the fraction under
the Greedy algorithm. This quantifies the value of waiting in dynamic matching markets.
For instance, consider a market where 1,000 new agents arrive each period, each of them
stays for one period on average, and the probability of an acceptable transaction between
two agents is 1
50
. Suppose that the market runs for 1,000 periods. Then the expected number
of perished agents under the Greedy algorithm is at least 23,800, whereas the same number
for the Patient algorithm is no more than 23.
Our second result is that gains from detailed consideration of the graph structure are small
compared to the gains from good timing decisions. That is, we show that local algorithms
that do not exploit the entire graph structure are close to the optimal benchmarks. If
the planner cannot identify urgent cases, then the Greedy algorithm is close to optimal.
Correspondingly, if the planner can identify urgent cases, then the Patient algorithm is close
to optimal. This is very fortunate, because the complexity of the graph structure makes
it intractable to compute optimal solutions via standard dynamic programming techniques.
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A corollary of this result is that urgency information and waiting are complementary: It is
only when the planner is informed about urgent cases that waiting can produce large gains.
Our third result is that our welfare comparisons are quite robust to the presence of waiting
costs. In many real-world marketplaces, brokers employ variants of the Greedy Algorithm to
minimize the waiting time of the agents.1 The previous results indicate that a consequence
of this strategy is a substantial increase in the fraction of perished agents. We show that if
the discount rate is not “too large”, then for a tuned value of α, the Patient(α) algorithm
generates a higher social welfare than the Greedy algorithm. In other words, if agents are not
too impatient, a matching algorithm which thickens the market by slightly increasing waiting
times delivers higher social welfare than a matching algorithm which simply optimizes the
speed of transactions.
Our forth result discusses the incentive-compatible implementation of the Patient(α)
algorithm. To implement this algorithm, the planner needs at least partial information
about departure times of agents. If agents know the urgency of their needs, but the planner
does not, they may have incentives to mis-report their departure times so as to hasten their
match or to increase their probability of getting matched. We show that if agents are not too
impatient, a dynamic mechanism without transfers can elicit such information. Specifically,
we show that it is arbitrarily close to optimal for agents to report the truth in large markets.
1.1 Related Work
There have been several studies on dynamic matching in the literature of Computer Science,
Economics, and Operations Research that each fit a specific market-place, such as the real
estate market, paired kidney exchange, or online advertising. But, to the best of our knowl-
edge, no previous work has offered a general framework for dynamic matching in networked
markets, and no previous work has considered stochastic departures.
Kurino [Kur09] and Bloch and Houy [BH12] study an overlapping generations model
of the housing market. In their models, agents have deterministic arrivals and departures.
In addition, the housing side of the market is infinitely durable and static, and houses do
not have preferences over agents. In the same context, Leshno [Les12] studies a one-sided
dynamic housing allocation problem in which houses arrive stochastically over time. His
model is based on two waiting lists and does not include a network structure. In addition,
agents remain in the waiting list until they are assigned to a house; i.e., they do not perish.
1For instance, our analysis of the Greedy Algorithm encompasses waiting list policies where brokers make
transactions as soon as they are available, giving priority to agents who arrived earlier.
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In the context of live-donor kidney exchanges, U¨nver [U¨10] studies a dynamic matching
model of the market in which agents have multiple types. In his model, agents never perish
and he does not analyze the effects of the graph structure on optimal policies explicitly. In
the Operations Research and Computer Science literatures, dynamic kidney matching has
been extensively studied, see e.g., [Zen02, SZ05, AS09, DPS12]. Perhaps most related to
our work is that of Ashlagi, Jaillet, and Manshadi [AJM13] who construct a discrete-time
finite-horizon model of dynamic kidney exchange. In their model, one new agent arrives at
the pool at each period, but, unlike our model, agents who are in the pool neither perish, nor
bear any waiting cost. Their model has two types of agents, one easy to match and one hard
to match, which then creates a specific graph structure that fits well to the kidney market.
The problem of online matching has been extensively studied in the literature of online
advertising. In this setting, advertisements are static, but queries arrive adversarially or
stochastically over time. Unlike our model, queries persist in the market for exactly one
period. Karp, Vazirani and Vazirani [KVV90] introduced the problem and designed a ran-
domized matching algorithm. Subsequently, the problem is considered under several arrival
models with pre-specified budgets for the advertisers, [MSVV07, GM08, FMMM09, MOS12].
In contrast to dynamic matching, there are numerous investigations of dynamic auctions
and dynamic mechanism design. Parkes and Singh [PS03] generalize the VCG mechanism
to a dynamic setting. Athey and Segal [AS07] construct efficient and incentive-compatible
dynamic mechanisms for private information settings. Pai and Vohra [PV13] and Gallien
[Gal06] extend Myerson’s optimal auction result [Mye81] to dynamic environments. We refer
interested readers to Parkes [Par07] for a review of the dynamic mechanism design literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our dynamic match-
ing market model and defines the objective. Section 3 presents our main contributions; we
recommend readers to take a look at this section to see a detailed description of our results
without getting into the details of the proofs. Then in Section 4, we analyze two optimal
policies as benchmarks and provide analytical bounds on their performance. In Section 5
we model our algorithms as Markov Chains and bound the mixing time of the chains. Sec-
tion 6 goes through a deep analysis of the Greedy algorithm, the Patient algorithm, and the
Patient(α) algorithm and bounds their performance. In Section 7, we take the waiting cost
into account and bound the social welfare under different algorithms. Section 8 considers
the case where the urgency of an agent’s needs is private information, and exhibits a truthful
direct revelation mechanism. Section 9 suggests generalizing extensions for the model and
concludes.
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2 The Model
In this section, we provide a stochastic continuous-time model for a bilateral matching market
that runs in the interval [0, T ]. Agents arrive at the market at rate m according to a
Poisson process, i.e., in any interval [t, t+ 1], m new agents enter the market in expectation.
Throughout the paper we assume m ≥ 1. For t ≥ 0, let At be the set of the agents in our
market at time t, and let Zt := |At|. We refer to At as the pool of the market. We start by
describing the evolution of At as a function of t ∈ [0, T ]. Since we are interested in the limit
behavior of At, without loss of generality, we may assume A0 = ∅. We use Ant to denote the
set of agents who enter the market at time t. Note that with probability 1, |Ant | ≤ 1.
An agent a ∈ At leaves the market at time t, if either of the following two events occur
at time t:
• a is matched with another agent b ∈ At,
• a becomes critical.
Each agent becomes critical according to an independent Poisson process with rate λ.
This implies that, if an agent a enters the market at time t0, then she becomes critical at
some time t0 +X where X is an exponential random variable with parameter λ. Therefore,
for any matching algorithm, a leaves the market at some time t1 where t0 ≤ t1 ≤ t0 + X.
The sojourn of a is the length of the interval that a is in the pool, i.e., s(a) := t1 − t0. An
agent a perishes if a leaves the market unmatched.2 We use Act ⊆ ∪0≤τ≤tAτ to denote the
set of agents that are critical at time t. Note that for any t ≥ 0, with probability 1, |Act | ≤ 1.
An agent receives zero utility if she leaves the market unmatched. If she is matched, she
receives a utility of 1 discounted at rate δ. Formally,
u(a) :=
e−δs(a) if a is matched0 otherwise.
Each pair of distinct agents regards the bilateral transaction between them as acceptable
with probability d/m, independent of any other pair of agents in the market. For any 0 ≤ t,
let Et ⊆ At × At be the set of acceptable bilateral transactions between the agents in the
market at time t, and let Gt = (At, Et). Note that if a, b ∈ At and a, b ∈ At′ , then (a, b) ∈ Et
if and only if (a, b) ∈ Et′ , i.e. the acceptable bilateral transactions are persistent throughout
2The interpretation of perishing is grimly obvious in the case of kidney exchanges; but we intend this as
a term of art.
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the process. For an agent a ∈ At we use Nt(a) ⊆ At to denote the set of neighbors of a in
Gt. It follows that, if the planner does not match any agents, then for any fixed t ≥ 0, Gt is
distributed as an Erdo¨s-Re´yni graph with parameter d/m and d is the average degree of the
agents [ER60]. To make our model interesting, throughout the paper we assume 0 ≤ d ≤ m.
Let A = ∪t≤TAnt , let E ⊆ A × A be the set of acceptable transactions between agents
in A3, and let G = (A,E). Observe that any realization of the above stochastic process is
uniquely defined given variables Ant , A
c
t for all t ≥ 0 and the set of acceptable transactions,
E. We call a vector (m, d, λ) a dynamic matching market. It turns out that without loss of
generality (by normalizing m and d) we can assume λ = 1 (see Proposition 6.14 for details).
So, throughout the paper, unless otherwise specified, we assume λ = 1.
Online Algorithms. An online algorithm at any time t0 only knows Gt for t ≤ t0 and
does not know anything about Gt′ for t
′ > t0. We enrich our model by letting the online
algorithm exploit the knowledge of critical agents at time t; nonetheless, we will extend
several of our theorems to the case where the online algorithm does not have this knowledge.
As will become clear, this assumption has a significant impact on the performance of any
online algorithm. At any time t ≥ 0 an online algorithm selects a possibly empty matching
in Gt (recall that a set of edges Mt ⊆ Et is a matching if no two edges share the same
endpoints).
We emphasize that the random sets At,Mt, Et, Nt and the random variable Zt are func-
tions of the underlying matching algorithm. We abuse the notation and do not include the
name of the algorithm when we analyze these variables.
The Goal. The goal of the Planner is then to design an online algorithm that maximizes
the social welfare, i.e., the sum of the utility of all agents in the market. Let ALG(T ) be the
set of matched agents by time T ,
ALG(T ) := {a ∈ A : a is matched by ALG}.
We may drop the T in the notation ALG(T ) if it is clear from context.
We define the social welfare of an online algorithm to be the expectation of the average
3Note that E ⊇ ∪t≤TEt, and the two sets are not typically equal, since two agents may find it acceptable
to transact, even though they are not in the pool at the same time because one of them was matched earlier.
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of the utility of all agents in the interval [0, T ]:
W(ALG) := E
 1
mT
∑
a∈ALG(T )
e−δs(a)

The goal of the Planner is to choose an online algorithm that maximizes the welfare for
large values of T (see Theorem 6.1, Theorem 6.2, and Theorem 7.1 for the dependency of
our results to T ).
For ease of exposition, we initially assume that δ = 0, i.e. the waiting cost is zero. In this
case, the goal of the Planner is to match the maximum number of agents, or equivalently to
minimize the number of perished agents. The loss of an online algorithm ALG is defined as
the ratio of the expected4 number of perished agents to the expected size of A,
L(ALG) :=
E [|A− ALG(T )− AT |]
E [|A|] =
E [|A− ALG(T )− AT |]
mT
.
When we assume δ = 0, we will use the L notation for the planner’s loss function. When
we consider δ > 0, we will use the W notation for social welfare.
Each of the above optimization problems can be modeled as a Markov Decision Process
(MDP)5 that is defined as follows. The state space is the set of pairs (H,B) where H is
any undirected graph of any size, and if the algorithm knows the set of critical agents, B is
a set of at most one vertex of H representing the corresponding critical agent. The action
space for a given state is the set of matchings on the graph H. Under this conception, an
algorithm designer wants to minimize the loss or maximize the social welfare over a time
period T .
Although this MDP has infinite number of states, with small error one can reduce the
state space to graphs of size at most O(m). Even in that case, this MDP has an exponential
number of states in m, since there are at least 2(
m
2 )/m! distinct graphs of size m6, so for even
moderately large markets7, we cannot apply tools from Dynamic Programming literature to
4We consider the expected value as a modeling choice. One may also be interested in objective functions
that depend on the variance of the performance, as well as the expected value. As will be seen later in
the paper, the performance of our algorithms are highly concentrated around their expected value, which
guarantees that the variance is very small in most of the cases.
5We recommend [Ber00] for background on Markov Decision Processes.
6This lower bound is derived as follows: When there are m agents, there are
(
m
2
)
possible edges, each
of which may be present or absent. Some of these graphs may have the same structure but different agent
indices. A conservative lower bound is to divide by all possible re-labellings of the agents (m!).
7For instance, for m = 30, there are more than 1098 states in the approximated MDP.
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find the optimum online matching algorithm.
Optimum Solutions. In many parts of this paper we compare the performance of an
online algorithm to the performance of an optimal omniscient algorithm. Unlike any online
algorithm, the omniscient algorithm has full information about the future, i.e., it knows the
full realization of the graph G.8 Therefore, it can return the maximum matching in this
graph as its output, and thus minimize the fraction of perished agents. Let OMN(T ) be
the set of matched agents in the maximum matching of G. The loss function under the
omnsicient algorithm at time T is
L(OMN) :=
E [|A−OMN(T )− AT |]
mT
Observe that for any online algorithm, ALG, and any realization of the probability space,
we have |ALG(T )| ≤ |OMN(T )|.9
It is also instructive to study the optimum online algorithm, an online algorithm with
unlimited computational power. By definition, an optimum online algorithm can solve the
exponential-sized state space Markov Decision Problem and return the corresponding match-
ing. We consider two different optimum online algorithms, OPTc, the algorithm that knows
the set of critical agents at time t (with associated loss L(OPTc)), and OPT, the algorithm
that does not know these sets (with associated loss L(OPT)). Let ALG be the loss under
any online algorithm that does not know the set of critical agents at time t. It follows that
L(ALG) ≥ L(OPT) ≥ L(OPTc) ≥ L(OMN).
Note that |ALG| and |OPT| are generally incomparable, and depend on the realization of
G we may even have |ALG| > |OPT|. Similarly, let ALGc be the loss under any online
algorithm that knows the set of critical agents at time t. It follows that
L(ALGc) ≥ L(OPTc) ≥ L(OMN).
8In computer science, these are equivalently called offline algorithms.
9This follows from a straightforward revealed-preference argument: For any realization, the optimum
offline policy has the information to replicate any given online policy, so it must do weakly better.
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3 Our Contributions
In this section, we present our main contributions. We provide high level intuition for the
results, without getting into the details. The rest of the paper proves the results that we
state here and adds detail.
We first introduce two simple online algorithms and a class of interpolating algorithms.
Then, we describe our results by comparing the performance of these algorithms with the
optimum solutions that we described above.
The first algorithm is the Greedy algorithm, which mimics ‘match-as-you-go’ algorithms
used in many real marketplaces. It delivers maximal matchings at any point in time, without
regard for the future.
Definition 3.1 (Greedy Algorithm:). If any new agent a enters the market at time t, then
match her with an arbitrary agent in Nt(a) whenever Nt(a) 6= ∅. We use L(Greedy) and
W(Greedy) to denote the loss and the social welfare under this algorithm, respectively.
Note that since |Ant | ≤ 1, in the above definition, we do not need to consider the case
where more than one agent enters the market. Observe that the graph Gt in the Greedy
algorithm is (almost) always an empty graph. By definition, the Greedy algorithm does not
use any information about the set of critical agents.
The second algorithm is a simple online algorithm that preserves two essential character-
istics of OPTc when δ = 0 (recall that OPTc is the optimum online algorithm with knowledge
of the set of critical agents):
i) A pair of agents a, b get matched in OPTc only if one of them is critical. This property
is called the rule of deferral match: Since δ = 0, if a, b can be matched and neither of
them is critical we can wait and match them later.
ii) If an agent a is critical at time t and Nt(a) 6= ∅ then OPTc matches a. This property is
a corollary of the following simple fact: matching a critical agent does not increase the
number of perished agents in any online algorithm.
Our second algorithm is designed to be the simplest possible online algorithm that satisfies
both of the above properties.
Definition 3.2 (Patient Algorithm). If an agent a becomes critical at time t, then match
her uniformly at random with an agent in Nt(a) whenever Nt(a) 6= ∅. We use L(Patient)
and W(Patient) to denote the loss and the social welfare under this algorithm, respectively.
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Observe that unlike the Greedy algorithm, here we need access to the set of critical
agents at time t. We do not intend the timing assumptions about critical agents to be
interpreted literally. An agent’s point of perishing represents the point at which it ceases
to be socially valuable to match that agent. Letting the Planner observe the set of critical
agents is a modeling convention that represents high-accuracy short-horizon information
about agent departures. An example of such information is the Model for End-Stage Liver
Disease (MELD) score, which accurately predicts 3-month mortality among patients with
chronic liver disease. The US Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network gives priority
to individuals with a higher MELD score, following a broad medical consensus that liver
donor allocation should be based on urgency of need and not substantially on waiting time.
[WEF+03] Note that the Patient algorithm exploits only short-horizon information about
urgent cases, as compared to the Omniscient algorithm which has full information of the
future.
The third algorithm interpolates between the Greedy and the Patient algorithms. The
idea of this algorithm is to assign independent exponential clocks with rates 1/α where
α ∈ [0,∞) to each agent a. If agent a’s exponential clock ticks, the market-maker attempts
to match her. If she has no neighbors, then she remains in the pool until she gets critical,
where the market-maker attempts to match her again.
A technical difficulty with the above matching algorithm is that it is not memoryless;
that is because when an agent gets critical and has no neighbors, she remains in the pool.
Therefore, instead of the above algorithm, we study a slightly different matching algorithm
(with a worse loss).
Definition 3.3 (The Patient(α) algorithm). Assign independent exponential clocks with
rates 1/α where α ∈ [0,∞) to each agent a. If agent a’s exponential clock ticks or if an
agent a becomes critical at time t, match her uniformly at random with an agent in Nt(a)
whenever Nt(a) 6= ∅. In both cases, if Nt(a) = ∅, treat that agent as if she has perished; i.e.,
never match her again. We use L(Patient(α)) and W(Patient(α)) to denote the loss and
the social welfare under this algorithm, respectively.
It is easy to see that an upper bound on the loss of the Patient(α) algorithm is an upper
bound on the loss of our desired interpolating algorithm.
By definition, an increase in α increases the waiting time of the agents as their exponential
clocks tick with a slower rate.10 In particular, Patient(∞) algorithm is equivalent to the
10The use of exponential clocks is a modelling convention that enables us to reduce waiting times while
retaining analytically tractable Markov properties.
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Patient algorithm, and Patient(0) is equivalent to the Greedy algorithm.
In the rest of this section we describe our contributions. To avoid cumbersome notation,
we state our results in the large-market long-horizon regime (i.e., as m→∞ and T →∞).
In the formal versions we will explicitly study the dependency on (m,T ). For example, we
show that the transition of the market to the steady state takes no more than O(log(m))
time units. In other words, many of the large time effects that we predict in our model can
be seen in poly-logarithmic time in the size of the market.
3.1 Value of Waiting
What are the advantages of waiting to thicken the market, compared to implementing ‘static
maximal’ matches via the Greedy Algorithm? Our first family of results study the advantages
of this deferral and see under what circumstances deferral is (substantially) gainful. First,
we show that the Patient Algorithm strongly outperforms the Greedy Algorithm. More
specifically, we show the number of perished agents in Patient is exponentially (in d) smaller
than the number of perished agents in Greedy.
Theorem 3.4. For d ≥ 2, as T,m→∞,
L(Patient) . 11(d+ 1) · e−d/2 · L(Greedy).
Proof Overview. We show that for large enough values of T and m, (i) L(Patient) . e−d/2
and (ii) L(OPT) & 1/(2d + 1). By the fact that L(Greedy) ≥ L(OPT) (since the Greedy
algorithm does not use information about critical agents) the theorem follows immediately.
The key idea in proving both parts is to carefully study the distribution of the pool size, Zt,
under any of these algorithms.
For (i), we show that pool size under the Patient algorithm is a Markov chain, it has
a unique stationary distribution and it mixes rapidly to the stationary distribution (see
Theorem 5.1). This implies that for t larger than mixing time, Zt is essentially distributed
as the stationary distribution of the Markov Chain. We show that under the stationary
distribution, with high probability, Zt ∈ [m/2,m]. Therefore, any critical agent has no
acceptable transactions with probability at most (1− d/m)m/2 ≤ e−d/2. This proves (i) (see
Subsection 6.2).
11We write A . B to denote that A ≤ B up to lower order terms that depend on m and T . In particular
as m,T →∞ these terms go to zero.
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For (ii), note that any algorithm which lacks the information of critical agents, the
expected perishing rate is equal to the pool size because any critical agent perishes with
probability one. Therefore, if the expected pool size is large, the perishing rate is very high
and we are done. On the other hand, if the expected pool size is very low, the perishing rate
is again very high because there will be many agents with no acceptable transactions during
their sojourn. We analyze the trade-off between the above two extreme cases and show that
even if the pool size is optimally chosen, the loss cannot be less than what we claimed in (ii)
(see Theorem 4.1).
A market-maker may not be willing to implement the Patient algorithm for various
reasons. First, the cost of waiting is usually not equal to zero; in other words, agents prefer
to be matched earlier (we discuss this cost in detail in Subsection 3.3). Second, the market-
maker may only have approximate knowledge of agents’ criticality times. Motivated by this,
we study the fraction of perished agents for the interpolating Patient(α) algorithm. The
next result shows that when α is not ‘too small’ (i.e., exponential clocks do not tick with a
very fast rate), then Patient(α) algorithm still (strongly) outperforms the Greedy algorithm.
In other words, a little waiting is substantially better than not waiting at all.
Theorem 3.5. Let α¯ := 1/α + 1. For d ≥ 2, as T,m→∞,
L(Patient(α)) . (d+ 1) · e−d/2α¯ · L(Greedy)
Proof Overview. First, we study a slightly modified (and worse) algorithm. In this algorithm
when an agent’s exponential clock ticks and she has no neighbors, the algorithm treats her
as a perished agent, i.e., she will never be matched. Now, by the additivity of the Poisson
process, the loss of this modified algorithm in a (m, d, 1) matching market is equal to the
loss of the Patient algorithm in a (m, d, α¯) matching market, where α¯ = 1/α + 1.
The next step is the key idea of the proof: we show that a matching market (m, d, α¯) is
equivalent to a matching market (m/α¯, d/α¯, 1) in the sense that any quantity in these two
markets is the same up to a time scale (see Definition 6.13). By this fact, the loss of the
Patient algorithm on a (m, d, α¯) matching market at time T is equal to the loss of Patient
algorithm on a (m/α¯, d/α¯, 1) market at time α¯T . But, we have already upper bounded the
latter in our previous results.
A numerical example clarifies the significance of this result. Consider the case of a kidney
exchange market, where 1000 new patients arrive to the market every year, their average
sojourn is 1 year and they can exchange kidneys with a random patient with probability 2
100
;
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Figure 2: If a2 gets critical in the above graph it is strictly better to match him to a1 as
opposed to a3
that is, d = 20. The above result for the Patient(α) algorithm suggests that the market-
maker can promise to match agents in less than 6 months (in expectation) while the fraction
of perished agents is at most 13% of the Greedy algorithm.
3.2 Value of Optimization
Our second family of results study the value of utilizing the underlying network structure.
Let us first give a simple example to show that by exploiting the underlying structure of the
network one can improve the expected number of matches. Let Gt be the graph shown in
Figure 2, and let a2 ∈ Act . Observe that it is strictly better to match a2 to a1 as opposed to a3.
So, an algorithm that utilizes the global structure of the underlying network can do strictly
better than an algorithm that decides only based on the local neighborhood of the agents.
Note that Patient and Greedy algorithms make decisions that depend only on the immediate
neighbors of the agent they are trying to match, so they cannot differentiate between a1 and
a3 in this example. By contrast, the optimal solutions can use their unlimited computation
power to exploit the structure of the network.
In the following theorem we show that our two algorithms that only depend on the local
neighborhood of the agents perform close to the the optimum solutions that make use of the
entire network. In particular, among all online algorithms that do not employ the criticality
information, the Greedy algorithm is one of the best in the sense that its loss is close to OPT.
Furthermore, among those algorithms that do employ the criticality information, the Patient
Algorithms is one of the best in the sense that its loss is close to OMN (and thus OPTc).
Note that L(Greedy) and L(OPT) are both fractionally small in d, whereas L(Patient) and
L(OMN) are exponentially small in d.
Theorem 3.6. For d ≥ 2, as T →∞,
L(Greedy) . (2 + 1/d) log 2 · L(OPT) . log(2)
d
,
L(Patient) .
√
L(OMN) · (d+ 1)/2 . 1
2
· e−d/2.
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Proof Overview. We prove that for large values of T and m, (i) L(Greedy) ≤ log(2)/d, and
(ii) L(OMN) & e−d/(d + 1). Note that the theorem follows from these and our results in
Theorem 3.4 (that L(Patient) . e−d/2/2 and L(OPT) & 1/(2d+ 1)).
For (i), similar to the Patient algorithm we show that the pool size under the Greedy
algorithm is a Markov chain, has a unique stationary distribution and mixes rapidly. Under
the stationary distribution, Zt ∈ [0, log(2)m/d] with high probability. Since Gt under the
Greedy algorithm is almost always an empty graph, all critical agents perish, so the perishing
rate is at most log(2)/d.
For (ii), we simply lower bound the fraction of agents who arrive the market at some
point in time and have no acceptable transactions to any agent during their sojourn (see
Theorem 4.2).
This constitutes an answer to the “when to match versus whom to match” question. Con-
sider the following scenario: A market maker has limited resources and wants to implement
an online matching algorithm. He can employ expert algorithm designers for his particular
market and purchase supercomputers to truly exploit the structure of the network. On the
other hand, he can fund investigations of the agents’ departure probabilities, and then use
the Patient(α) algorithm with a tuned value of α. The above result suggests that it is more
advantageous that he spends the money on the latter.
A corollary of this result is that waiting and criticality information are complements. If
the Planner does not know about urgent cases, then the Planner cannot substantially reduce
losses by waiting: L(Greedy) is close to L(OPT). If the Planner is not willing to wait,
then knowing about urgent cases yields no improvement: Under the Greedy algorithm, the
market is almost always an empty graph, so it cannot address the needs of critical agents. It
is only when waiting and criticality information are combined that losses can be dramatically
reduced.
3.3 Welfare Under Discounting
In many practical applications, market brokers employ variants of the Greedy algorithm
in order to minimize the waiting time of the agents. It is now clear that the immediate
consequence of this strategy is a substantial increase in the fraction of perished agents. In
this part we want to account for the cost of waiting and study online algorithms that optimize
social welfare.
It is clear that if the agents are very impatient (i.e., they have very high waiting costs) the
market-maker is better off implementing the Greedy algorithm. On the other hand, if agents
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are perfectly patient (i.e., the cost of waiting is zero) the Patient algorithm is substantially
better. Therefore, a natural welfare economics question is as follows: For which values of δ is
the Patient algorithm (or Patient(α) algorithm) socially preferred to the Greedy algorithm?
Our next result studies social welfare under the Patient, Patient(α) and Greedy Algo-
rithms. We show that for small enough δ, there exists a Patient(α) Algorithm that is socially
preferable to the Greedy Algorithm.
Theorem 3.7. For any 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1
6 log(d)
and d ≥ 7 there exists an α ≥ 0 such that as
m,T →∞,
W(Patient(α)) ≥W(Greedy).
In particular, for δ ≤ 1/2d we have
W(Patient) ≥W(Greedy).
Proof Overview. We show that (i) W(Patient) ≥ 2
2+δ
(1 − e−d/2) and (ii) W(Greedy) ≤
1 − 1
2d+1
. As a corollary of our market equivalence result, (i) shows that for α¯ = 1/α + 1,
W(Patient(α)) ≥ 2
2+δ/α¯
(1− e−d/2α¯).
(ii) can be proved easily just by noting that 1/(2d + 1) fraction of agents perish in the
Greedy algorithm. Therefore, even if all of the matched agents receive a utility of 1 the
social welfare is no more than 1− 1/(2d+ 1).
The proof of (i) is more involved. The idea is to define a random variable Xt representing
the potential utility of the agents in the pool at time t, i.e., if all of agents of At get matched
immediately, then they receive a total utility of Xt. It turns out that Xt can be estimated
with a small error by studying the evolution of the system through a differential equation.
Given Xt the expected utility of an agent that is matched at time t is exactly Xt/Zt. Using
our concentration results on Zt, we can easily compute the expected utility of the agents
that are matched in any interval [t, t + dt]. Integrating over all t ∈ [0, T ] proves the claim.
A numerical example illustrates these magnitudes. Consider a barter market, where 1000
new traders arrive at the market every week, their average sojourn is one week, and there is
a satisfactory trade between two random agents in the market with probability 2
100
; that is,
d = 10. Then Theorem 3.7 implies that if the cost associated with waiting for one week is
less than 10% of the surplus from a typical trade, then the Patient(α) algorithm is socially
preferred to the Greedy algorithm.
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3.4 Value of Information and Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms
It follows from Theorem 3.6 that having even short-horizon information about agents’ depar-
ture times is very valuable, because it substantially reduces perishings. In particular, since
L(OPT) ≥ 1/(2d + 1), under any matching algorithm that does not have any information
about agents’ departure times, at least 1/(2d+ 1) fraction of the agents will perish.
In many settings, it is plausible that agents have privileged insight into their own depar-
ture timings. In general, agents may have incentives to misreport whether they are critical,
in order to increase their chance of getting matched or to decrease their waiting time. We
exhibit a truthful mechanism without transfers that elicits such information from agents.
We assume that agents are fully rational and know the underlying parameters, but they
do not observe the actual realization of the stochastic process. That is, agents observe
whether they are critical, but do not observe Gt, while the Planner observes Gt but does
not observe which agents are critical. Consequently, agents’ strategies are independent of
the realized sample path. Our results are sensitive to this assumption12; for instance, if the
agent knew that she had a neighbor, or knew that the pool at that moment was very large,
she would have an incentive under our mechanism to falsely report that she was critical.
The truthful mechanism, Patient-Mechanism(α), is described below.
Definition 3.8 (Patient-Mechanism(α)). Assign independent exponential clocks with rate
1/α to each agent a, where α ∈ [0,∞). If agent’s exponential clock ticks or if she reports
becoming critical, the market-maker attempts to match her to a random neighbor. If the
agent has no neighbors, the market-maker treats her as if she has perished, i.e., she will
never be matched again.
Each agent a selects a mixed strategy by choosing a function ca(.); at the interval [t, t+dt]
after her arrival, if she is not yet critical she reports becoming critical with rate ca(t)dt, and
when she truly gets critical she reports that immediately. Our main result in this section
asserts that if agents are not too impatient, then the Patient-Mechanism(α) is (incentive-
compatible) implementable in the sense that the truthful strategy profile is an -mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium.13
12This assumption is plausible in many settings; generally, centralized brokers know more about the current
state of the market than individual traders. Indeed, frequently agents approach centralized brokers because
they do not know who is available to trade with them.
13For a rigorous definition of an -mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, see Definition 8.1.
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Theorem 3.9. Suppose that the market is at stationary and d = polylog(m)14. Let α¯ =
1/α + 1 and β = α¯(1 − d/m)m/α¯. Then, for 0 ≤ δ ≤ β, ca(t) = 0 for all a, t (i.e., truthful
strategy profile) is an -mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for Patient-Mechanism(α), where
→ 0 as m→∞.
In particular, if d ≥ 2 and 0 ≤ δ ≤ e−d/2, the truthful strategy profile is an -mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium for Patient-Mechanism(∞), where → 0 as m→∞.
Proof Overview. There is a hidden obstacle in proving that truthful reporting is incentive-
compatible: Even if one assumes that the market is in a stationary distribution at the point
an agent enters, the agent’s beliefs about pool size may change as time passes. In particular,
an agent makes inferences about the current distribution of pool size, conditional on not
having been matched yet, and this conditional distribution is different from the stationary
distribution. This makes it difficult to compute the payoffs from deviations from truthful
reporting. We tackle this problem by using the concentration bounds from Proposition 6.10,
and focusing on -mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, which allows small deviations from full
optimality.
The intuition behind this proof is that an agent can be matched in one of two ways
under Patient-Mechanism(∞): Either she becomes critical, and has a neighbor, or one of
her neighbors becomes critical, and is matched to her. By symmetry, the chance of either
happening is the same, because with probability 1, every matched pair consists of one critical
agent and one non-critical agent. When an agent declares that she is critical, she is taking her
chance that she has a neighbor in the pool right now. By contrast, if she waits, there is some
probability that another agent will become critical and be matched to her. Consequently,
for small δ, agents will opt to wait.
3.5 Technical Contributions
As alluded to above, most of our results follow from concentration results on the distribution
of the pool size for each of the online algorithms, Proposition 6.6, Proposition 6.10. In this
last part we describe ideas behind these crucial results.
For analyzing many classes of stochastic processes one needs to prove concentration
bounds on functions defined on the underlying process by means of Central limit theorem,
Chernoff bounds or Azuma-Hoeffding bounds. In our case many of these tools fail. This is
because we are interested in proving that for any large time t, a given function is concentrated
14polylog(m) denotes any polynomial function of log(m).
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in an interval whose size depend only on d,m and not t. Since t can be significantly larger
than d,m a direct proof fails.
In contrast we observe that Zt is a Markov Chain for a large class of online algorithms.
Building on this observation, first we show that the underlying Markov Chain has a unique
stationary distribution and it mixes rapidly. Then we use the stationary distribution of the
Markov Chain to prove our concentration bounds.
However, that is not the end of the story. We do not a closed form expression for
the stationary distribution of the chain, because we are dealing with an infinite state space
continuous time Markov Chain where the transition rates are complex functions of the states.
Instead, we use the following trick. Suppose we want to prove that Zt is contained in an
interval [k∗ − f(m, d), k∗ + f(m, d)] for some k∗ ∈ N with high probability, where f(m, d)
is a function of m, d that does not depend on t. We consider a sequence of pairs of states
P1 := (k
∗−1, k∗+ 1), P2 := (k∗−2, k∗+ 2), etc. We show that if the Markov Chain is at any
of the states of Pi, it is more likely (by an additive function of m, d) that it jumps to a state
of Pi−1 as opposed to Pi+1. Using balance equations and simple algebraic manipulations, this
implies that the probability of states in Pi geometrically decrease as i increases. In other
words Z∗ is concentrated in a small interval around k∗. We believe that this technique can
be used in studying other complex stochastic processes.
4 Performance of the Optimum Solutions
In this section we lower-bound the loss of the optimum solutions in terms of d. In particular,
we prove the following theorems.
Theorem 4.1. If m > 10d, then for any T > 0
L(OPT) ≥ 1
2d+ 1 + d2/m
.
Theorem 4.2. If m > 10d, then for any T > 0,
L(OMN) ≥ e
−d−d2/m
d+ 1 + d2/m
Before proving the above theorems, it is useful to study the evolution of the system in
the case where no agents are ever matched, i.e., the online algorithm does nothing. We later
use this analysis in this section, as well as Section 5 and Section 6.
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We adopt the notation A˜t and Z˜t to denote the agents in the pool and the pool size in
this case. Observe that by definition for any matching algorithm and any realization of the
process,
Zt ≤ Z˜t. (4.1)
Using the above equation, in the following fact we show that for any matching algorithm
E [Zt] ≤ m.
Proposition 4.3. For any t0 ≥ 0,
E
[
Z˜t0
]
= (1− e−t0)m.
Proof. Let a1, . . . , aK be the set of agents who enter the market in the interval [0, t0] where
K is a random variable and the index is arbitrary and not by order of entry. Let Xai be the
random variable indicating that ai ∈ A˜t0 . Then,
P [Xai ] =
∫ t0
t=0
1
t0
P [s(a) ≥ t0 − t] dt = 1
t0
∫ t0
t=0
et−t0dt =
1− e−t0
t0
.
Therefore, E
[
Z˜t0
]
= E
[
E
[∑K
i=1Xai |K
]]
= E
[
K
t0
(1− e−t0)
]
= (1− e−t0)m.
4.1 Loss of the Optimum Online Algorithm
In this section, we prove Theorem 4.1. Let ζ be the expected pool size of the OPT,
ζ := Et∼unif[0,T ] [Zt]
Since OPT does not know the Act we can assume that each critical agent perishes with
probability 1. Therefore,
L(OPT) =
1
m · T E
[∫ T
t=0
Ztdt
]
=
ζT
mT
= ζ/m. (4.2)
To finish the proof we need to lower bound ζ by m/(2d + 1). We provide an indirect proof
by showing a lower-bound on L(OPT) which in turn lower-bounds ζ.
Our idea is to lower-bound the probability that an agent does not have any acceptable
transactions throughout her sojourn, and this directly gives a lower-bound on L(OPT). Fix
an agent a ∈ A. Conditioned on a ∈ A, a enters the market at a time t0 ∼ unif[0, T ], and
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s(a) = t. Therefore,
P [N(a) = ∅] =
∫ ∞
t=0
P [s(a) = t] · E [(1− d/m)|At0 |] · E [(1− d/m)|Ant0,t+t0 |] dt
≥
∫ ∞
t=0
e−t · (1− d/m)E[Zt0 ] · (1− d/m)E[|Ant0,t+t0 |]dt
=
∫ ∞
t=0
e−t · (1− d/m)ζ · (1− d/m)mtdt
where the second inequality follows by the Jensen’s inequality. Since d/m < 1/10, 1−d/m ≥
e−d/m−d
2/m2 ,
L(OPT) ≥ P [N(a) = ∅] ≥ e−ζ(d/m+d2/m2)
∫ ∞
t=0
e−t(1+d+d
2/m)dt ≥ 1− ζ(1 + d/m)d/m
1 + d+ d2/m
(4.3)
Putting (4.2) and (4.3) together, for β := ζd/m we get
L(OPT) ≥ max{1− β(1 + d/m)
1 + d+ d2/m
,
β
d
} ≥ 1
2d+ 1 + d2/m
where the last inequality follows by letting β = d
2d+1+d2/m
be the minimizer of the middle
expression.
4.2 Loss of the Omniscient Algorithm
In this section, we prove Theorem 4.2. This demonstrates that, in the high-information
setting, no policy can yield a faster-than-exponential decrease in losses, as a function of the
average degree of each agent.
The proof is very similar to Theorem 4.1. Let ζ be the expected pool size of the OMN,
ζ := Et∼unif[0,T ] [Zt] .
By (4.1) and Proposition 4.3,
ζ ≤ Et∼unif[0,T ]
[
Z˜t
]
≤ m.
Note that (4.2) does not hold in this case because the optimum offline algorithm knows the
set of critical agents at time t.
Now, fix an agent a ∈ A, and let us lower-bound the probability that N(a) = ∅. Say a
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enters the market at time t0 ∼ unif[0, T ] and s(a) = t, then
P [N(a) = ∅] =
∫ ∞
t=0
P [s(a) = t] · E [(1− d/m)Zt0] · E [(1− d/m)|Ant0,t+t0 |] dt
≥
∫ ∞
t=0
e−t(1− d/m)ζ+mtdt ≥ e
−ζ(1+d/m)d/m
1 + d+ d2/m
≥ e
−d−d2/m
1 + d+ d2/m
.
where the first inequality uses the Jensen’s inequality and the second inequality uses the fact
that d/m < 1/10.
5 Modeling an Online Algorithm as a Markov Chain
5.1 Background
In this section we show that in both of the Patient and Greedy algorithms the random
processes Zt are Markovian, have unique stationary distributions and mix rapidly. Before
getting into the details we provide a brief overview on continuous time Markov Chains. We
refer interested readers to [Nor98, LPW06] for detailed discussions.
Let Zt be a continuous time Markov Chain on the non-negative integers (N) that starts
from state zero. For any two states i, j ∈ N, we assume that the rate of going from i to j is
ri→j ≥ 0. The rate matrix Q ∈ N× N is defined as follows,
Q(i, j) :=
ri→j if i 6= j,∑
k 6=i−ri→k otherwise.
Note that, by definition, the sum of the entries in each row of Q is zero. It turns out that
(see e.g., [Nor98, Theorem 2.1.1]) the transition probability in t units of time is,
etQ =
∞∑
i=0
tiQi
i!
.
Let Pt := e
tQ be the transition probability matrix of the Markov Chain in t time units. It
follows that,
d
dt
Pt = PtQ. (5.1)
In particular, in any infinitesimal time step dt, the chain moves based on Q · dt.
A Markov Chain is irreducible if for any pair of states i, j ∈ N, j is reachable from i with
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a non-zero probability. Fix a state i ≥ 0, and suppose that Zt0 = i, and let T1 be the first
jump out of i (note that T1 is distributed as an exponential random variable). State i is
positive recurrent iff
E [inf{t ≥ T1 : Zt = i}|Zt0 = i] <∞ (5.2)
It follows by the ergodic theorem that a (continuous time) Markov Chain has a unique
stationary distribution if and only if it has a positive recurrent state [Nor98, Theorem 3.8.1].
Let pi : N→ R+ be the stationary distribution of a Markov chain. It follows by the definition
that for any t ≥ 0, Pt = piPt. The balance equations of a Markov chain say that for any
S ⊆ N, ∑
i∈S,j /∈S
pi(i)ri→j =
∑
i∈S,j /∈S
pi(j)rj→i. (5.3)
Let zt(.) be the distribution of Zt at time t ≥ 0, i.e., zt(i) := P [Zt = i] for any integer
i ≥ 0. For any  > 0, we define the mixing time (in total variation distance) of this Markov
Chain as follows,
τmix() = inf
{
t : ‖zt − pi‖TV :=
∞∑
k=0
|pi(k)− zt(k)| ≤ 
}
. (5.4)
5.2 Markov Chain Characterization
The following is the main theorem of this section. We show that this Markov Chain mixes
in time O(log(m)).
Theorem 5.1. For the Patient and Greedy algorithms and any 0 ≤ t0 < t1,
P [Zt1|Zt for 0 ≤ t < t1] = P [Zt1 |Zt for t0 ≤ t < t1] .
The corresponding Markov Chains have unique stationary distributions and mix in time
O(log(m) log(1/)) in total variation distance,
τmix() ≤ O(log(m) log(1/)).
First, we argue that Zt is Markovian for the Patient and Greedy algorithms. This follows
from the following simple observation.
Proposition 5.2. Under either of Greedy or Patient algorithms, for any t ≥ 0, conditioned
on Zt, the distribution of Gt is uniquely defined. So, given Zt, Gt is conditionally independent
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of Zt′ for t
′ < t.
Proof. Under the Greedy algorithm, at any time t ≥ 0, |Et| = 0. Therefore, conditioned on
Zt, Gt is an empty graph with |Zt| vertices.
On the other hand, the Patient algorithm’s never looks at the edges between non-critical
agents, so the algorithm is oblivious to these edges. It follows that under the Patient al-
gorithm, for any t ≥ 0, conditioned on Zt, Gt is an Erdo¨s-Re´yni random graph with |Zt|
vertices and parameter d/m.
It follows from the above proposition that Zt is Markovian under the Greedy Algorithm
and the Patient Algorithm.
5.3 Stationary Distributions: Existence and Uniqueness
In this part we show that the Markov Chain on Zt has a unique stationary distribution under
each of the Greedy and Patient algorithms. In the last section we proved that Zt is indeed
a Markov chain on non-negative integers (N) that starts from state zero.
First, we show that the Markov Chain is irreducible. First note that every state i > 0 is
reachable from state 0 with a non-zero probability. It is sufficient that i agents arrive at the
market with no acceptable bilateral transactions. On the other hand, state 0 is reachable
from any i > 0 with a non-zero probability. It is sufficient that all of the i agents in the
pool become critical and no new agents arrive at the market. So Zt is an irreducible Markov
Chain.
Therefore, by the ergodic theorem it has a unique stationary distribution if and only if it
has a positive recurrent state [Nor98, Theorem 3.8.1]. In the rest of the proof we show that
the state zero is positive recurrent. By (4.1) Zt = 0 if Z˜t = 0. So, it is sufficient to show
E
[
inf{t ≥ T1 : Z˜t = 0}|Z˜t0 = 0
]
<∞. (5.5)
It follows that Z˜t is just a continuous time birth-death process on N with the following
transition rates,
r˜k→k+1 = m and r˜k→k−1 := k (5.6)
It is well known (see e.g. [GS92, p. 249-250]) that Z˜t has a stationary distribution if and
only if
∞∑
k=1
r˜0→1r˜1→2 . . . r˜k−1→k
r˜1→0 . . . r˜k→k−1
<∞.
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Using (5.6) we have
∞∑
k=1
r˜0→1r˜1→2 . . . r˜k−1→k
r˜1→0 . . . r˜k→k−1
=
∞∑
k=1
mk
k!
= em − 1 <∞
Therefore, the birth death process has a unique stationary distribution and the state 0 is
positive recurrent. This proves (5.5) so Zt is an ergodic Markov Chain.
5.4 Upper bounding the Mixing Time
In this part we complete the proof of Theorem 5.1 and we upper-bound the mixing of Markov
Chain Zt for the Greedy and Patient algorithms. Let pi(.) be the stationary distribution of
the Markov Chain.
5.4.1 Mixing time of the Greedy Algorithm
We start with the Greedy algorithm. We use the coupling technique (see [LPW06, Chapter
5]). Suppose we have two Markov Chains Yt, Zt (with different starting distributions) each
running the Greedy algorithm. We define a joint Markov Chain (Yt, Zt)
∞
t=0 with the property
that projecting on either of Yt and Zt we see the stochastic process of Greedy algorithm, and
that they stay together at all times after their first simultaneous visit to a single state, i.e.,
if Yt0 = Zt0 , then Yt = Zt for t ≥ t0.
Next we define the joint chain. We define this chain such that for any t ≥ t0, |Yt−Zt| ≤
|Yt0 − Zt0|. Assume that Yt0 = y, Zt0 = z at some time t0 ≥ 0, for y, z ∈ N. Without loss
of generality assume y < z (note that if y = z there is nothing to define). Consider any
arbitrary labeling of the agents in the first pool with a1, . . . , ay, and in the second pool with
b1, . . . , bz. Define z + 1 independent exponential clocks such that the first z clocks have rate
1, and the last one has rate m. If the i-th clock ticks for 1 ≤ i ≤ y, then both of ai and bi
become critical (recall that in the Greedy algorithm the critical agent leaves the market right
away). If y < i ≤ z, then bi becomes critical, and if i = z + 1 new agents ay+1, bz+1 arrive
to the markets. In the latter case we need to draw edges between the new agents and those
currently in the pool. We use z independent coins each with parameter d/m. We use the
first y coins to decide simultaneously on the potential transactions (ai, ay+1) and (bi, bz+1)
for 1 ≤ i ≤ y, and the last z − y coins for the rest. This implies that for any 1 ≤ i ≤ y,
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(ai, ay+1) is an acceptable transaction iff (bi, bz+1) is acceptable. Observe that if ay+1 has at
least one acceptable transaction then so has bz+1 but the converse does not necessarily hold.
It follows from the above construction that |Yt − Zt| is a non-increasing function of t.
Furthermore, this value decreases when either of the agents by+1, . . . , bz become critical (we
note that this value may also decrease when a new agent arrives but we do not exploit this
situation here). Now suppose |Y0 − Z0| = k. It follows that the two chains arrive to the
same state when all of the k agents that are not in common become critical. This has the
same distribution as the maximum of k independent exponential random variables with rate
1. Let Ek be a random variable that is the maximum of k independent exponentials of rate
1. For any t ≥ 0,
P [Zt 6= Yt] ≤ P
[
E|Y0−Z0| ≤ t
]
= (1− e−t)|Y0−Z0|.
Now, we are ready to bound the mixing time of the Greedy algorithm. Let zt(.) be the
distribution of the pool size at time t when there is no agent in the pool at time 0 and let
pi(.) be the stationary distribution. Fix 0 <  < 1/4, and let β ≥ 0 be a parameter that
we fix later. Let (Yt, Zt) be the joint Markov chain that we constructed above where Yt is
started at the stationary distribution and Zt is started at state zero. Then,
‖zt − pi‖TV ≤ P [Yt 6= Zt] =
∞∑
i=0
pi(i)P [Yt 6= Zt|Y0 = i]
≤
∞∑
i=0
pi(i)P [Ei > t]
≤
βm/d∑
i=0
(1− (1− e−t)βm/d) +
∞∑
i=βm/d
pi(i) ≤ β
2m2
d2
e−t + 2e−m(β−1)
2/2d
where the last inequality follows by equation (A.4) and Proposition 6.6. Letting β = 1 +√
2 log(2/) and t = 2 log(βm/d) · log(2/) we get ‖zt − pi‖TV ≤  that proves the theorem.
5.4.2 Mixing time of the Patient Algorithm
It remains to bound the mixing time of the Patient algorithm. The construction of the joint
Markov Chain is very similar to the above construction except some caveats. Again, suppose
Yt0 = y and Zt0 = z for y, z ∈ N and t0 ≥ 0 and that y < z. Let a1, . . . , ay and b1, . . . , bz be
a labeling of the agents. We consider two cases.
Case 1) z > y + 1. In this case the construction is essentially the same as the Greedy
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algorithm. The only difference is that we toss random coins to decide on acceptable
bilateral transactions at the time that an agent becomes critical (and not at the
time of arrival). It follows that when new agents arrive the size of each of the pools
increase by 1 (so the difference remains unchanged). If any of the agents by+1, . . . , bz
become critical then the size of second pool decrease by 1 or 2 and so is the difference
of the pool sizes.
Case 2) z = y + 1. In this case we define a slightly different coupling. This is because, for
some parameters and starting values, the Markov chains may not visit the same
state for a long time for the coupling defined in Case 1 . If z  m/d, then with
a high probability any critical agent gets matched. Therefore, the magnitude of
|Zt−Yt| does not quickly decrease (for a concrete example, consider the case where
d = m, y = m/2 and z = m/2 + 1). Therefore, in this case we change the coupling.
We use z + 2 independent clocks where the first z are the same as before, i.e., they
have rate 1 and when the i-th clock ticks bi (and ai if i ≤ y) become critical. The
last two clocks have rate m, when the z+ 1-st clock ticks a new agent arrives to the
first pool and when z + 2-nd one ticks a new agent arrives to the second pool.
Let |Y0 − Z0| = k. By the above construction |Yt − Zt| is a decreasing function of t unless
|Yt − Zt| = 1. In the latter case this difference goes to zero if a new agent arrives to the
smaller pool and it increases if a new agent arrives to the bigger pool. Let τ be the first time
t where |Yt − Zt| = 1. Similar to the Greedy algorithm, the event |Yt − Zt| = 1 occurs if the
second to maximum of k independent exponential random variables with rate 1 is at most
t. Therefore,
P [τ ≤ t] ≤ P [Ek ≤ t] ≤ (1− e−t)k
Now, suppose t ≥ τ ; we need to bound the time it takes to make the difference zero.
First, note that after time τ the difference is never more than 2. Let Xt be the (continuous
time) Markov Chain illustrated in Figure 3 and suppose X0 = 1. Using m ≥ 1, it is easy to
see that if Xt = 0 for some t ≥ 0, then |Yt+τ −Zt+τ | = 0 (but the converse is not necessarily
true). It is a simple exercise that for t ≥ 8,
P [Xt 6= 0] =
∞∑
k=0
e−ttk
k!
2−k/2 ≤
t/4∑
k=0
e−ttk
k!
+ 2−t/8 ≤ 2−t/4 + 2−t/8. (5.7)
Now, we are ready to upper-bound the mixing time of the Patient algorithm. Let zt(.) be
the distribution of the pool size at time t where there is no agent at time 0, and let pi(.) be
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Figure 3: A three state Markov Chain used for analyzing the mixing time of the Patient
algorithm.
the stationary distribution. Fix  > 0, and let β ≥ 2 be a parameter that we fix later. Let
(Yt, Zt) be the joint chain that we constructed above where Yt is started at the stationary
distribution and Zt is started at state zero.
‖zt − pi‖TV ≤ P [Zt 6= Yt] ≤ P [τ ≤ t/2] + P [Xt ≤ t/2]
≤
∞∑
i=0
pi(i)P [τ ≤ t/2|Y0 = i] + 2−t/8+1
≤ 2−t/8+1 +
∞∑
i=0
pi(i)(1− (1− e−t/2)i)
≤ 2−t/8+1 +
βm∑
i=0
(it/2) +
∞∑
i=βm
pi(i) ≤ 2−t/8+1 + β
2m2t
2
+ 6e−(β−1)m/3.
where in the second to last equation we used equation (A.4) and in the last equation we
used Proposition 6.10. Letting β = 10 and t = 8 log(m) log(4/) implies that ‖zt− pi‖TV ≤ 
which proves Theorem 5.1.
6 Performance Analysis
In this section we upper bound L(Greedy) and L(Patient) as a function of d, and we upper
bound L(Patient(α)) as a function of d and α. We prove the following three theorems.
Theorem 6.1. For any  ≥ 0 and T > 0,
L(Greedy) ≤ log(2)
d
+
τmix()
T
+ 6+O
( log(m/d)√
dm
)
, (6.1)
where τmix() ≤ 2 log(m/d) log(2/).
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Theorem 6.2. For any  > 0 and T > 0,
L(Patient) ≤ max
z∈[1/2,1]
(
z + O˜(1/
√
m)
)
e−zd +
τmix()
T
+
m
d2
+ 2/m, (6.2)
where τmix() ≤ 8 log(m) log(4/).
Theorem 6.3. Let α¯ := 1/α + 1. For any  > 0 and T > 0,
L(Patient(α)) ≤ max
z∈[1/2,1]
(
z + O˜(
√
α¯/m)
)
e−zd/α¯ +
τmix()
α¯T
+
mα¯
d2
+ 2α¯/m,
where τmix() ≤ 8 log(m/α¯) log(4/).
We will prove Theorem 6.1 in Subsection 6.1, Theorem 6.2 in Subsection 6.2 and Theo-
rem 6.3 in Subsection 6.3.
6.1 Loss of the Greedy Algorithm
In this part we upper bound L(Greedy). We crucially exploit the fact that Zt is a Markov
Chain and has a unique stationary distribution, pi : N→ R+ (see Theorem 5.1 for proof).
Let ζ := EZ∼µ [Z] be the expected size of the pool under the stationary distribution of the
Markov Chain on Zt. First, observe that if the Markov Chain on Zt is mixed, then the agents
perish at the rate of ζ. Roughly speaking, if we run the Greedy algorithm for a sufficiently
long time then Markov Chain on size of the pool mixes and we get L(Greedy) ≈ ζ
m
. This
observation is made rigorous in the following lemma. Note that as T and m grow, the first
three terms become negligible.
Lemma 6.4. For any  > 0, and T > 0,
L(Greedy) ≤ τmix()
T
+ 6+
1
m
2−6m +
EZ∼pi [Z]
m
.
Proof. By Proposition 4.3, E [Zt] ≤ m for all t, so
L(Greedy) =
1
m · T E
[∫ T
t=0
Ztdt
]
=
1
mT
∫ T
t=0
E [Zt] dt
≤ 1
mT
m · τmix() + 1
mT
∫ T
t=τmix()
E [Zt] dt (6.3)
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where the second equality uses the linearity of expectation. Let Z˜t be the number of agents
in the pool at time t when we do not match any pair of agents. By (4.1),
P [Zt ≥ i] ≤ P
[
Z˜t ≥ i
]
.
Therefore, for t ≥ τmix(),
E [Zt] =
∞∑
i=1
P [Zt ≥ i] ≤
6m∑
i=0
P [Zt ≥ i] +
∞∑
i=6m+1
P
[
Z˜t ≥ i
]
≤
6m∑
i=0
(PZ∼pi [Z ≥ i] + ) +
∞∑
i=6m+1
∞∑
`=i
m`
`!
≤ EZ∼pi [Z] + 6m+
∞∑
i=6m+1
2
mi
i!
≤ EZ∼pi [Z] + 6m+ 4m
6m
(6m)!
≤ EZ∼pi [Z] + 6m+ 2−6m. (6.4)
where the second inequality uses P
[
Z˜t = `
]
≤ m`/`! that is proved below and the last
inequality follows by the Stirling’s approximation of (6m)!15.
Putting (6.3) and (6.4) proves the lemma.
Claim 6.5. For any t0 > 0,
P
[
Z˜t0 = `
]
≤ m
`
`!
.
Proof. Let K be a random variable indicating the number agents who enter the pool in the
interval [0, t0]. By Bayes rule,
P
[
Z˜t0 = `
]
=
∞∑
k=0
P
[
Z˜t0 = `,K = k
]
=
∞∑
k=0
P
[
Z˜t0 = `|K = k
]
· (mt0)
ke−mt0
k!
,
where the last equation follows by the fact that arrival rate of the agents is a Poisson random
variable of rate m. In Proposition 4.3 we show that condition on an agent a arrives in the
interval [0, t0], the probability that he is in the pool at time t0 is (1 − e−t0)/t0. Therefore,
conditioned on K = k, the distribution of the number of agents at time t0 is a Binomial
15Stirling’s approximation states that
n! ≥
√
2pin
(n
e
)n
.
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Figure 4: An illustration of the transition paths of the Zt Markov Chain under the Greedy
algorithm
random variable B(k, p), where p := (1− e−t0)/t0). So,
P
[
Z˜t0 = `
]
=
∞∑
k=`
(
k
`
)
· p` · (1− p)k−` (mt0)
ke−mt0
k!
=
∞∑
k=`
mke−mt0
`!(k − `)!(1− e
−t0)`(t0 − 1 + e−t0)k−`
≤ m
`e−mt0
`!
∞∑
k=`
(mt0)
k−`
(k − `)! =
m`
`!
.
This completes the proof of Lemma 6.4.
So, in the rest of the proof we just need to upper bound EZ∼pi [Z]. Unfortunately, we do
not have any closed form expression of the stationary distribution, pi(.). Instead, we use the
balance equations of the Markov Chain defined on Zt to characterize pi(.) and upper bound
EZ∼pi [Z].
Let us rigorously define the transition probability operator of the Markov Chain on Zt.
For any pool size k, the Markov Chain transits only to the states k + 1 or k − 1. It transits
to state k + 1 if a new agent arrives and the market-maker cannot match him (i.e., the new
agent does not have any edge to the agents currently in the pool) and the Markov Chain
transits to the state k− 1 if a new agent arrives and is matched or an agent currently in the
pool gets critical. Thus, the transition rates rk→k+1 and rk→k−1 are defined as follows,
rk→k+1 := m
(
1− d
m
)k
(6.5)
rk→k−1 := k +m
(
1−
(
1− d
m
)k)
. (6.6)
In the above equations we used the fact that agents arrive at rate m, they perish at rate 1
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and the probability of an acceptable transaction between two agents is d/m.
Let us write down the balance equation for the above Markov Chain (see equation (5.3)
for the full generality). Consider the cut separating the states 0, 1, 2, . . . , k− 1 from the rest
(see Figure 4 for an illustration). It follows that
pi(k − 1)rk−1→k = pi(k)rk→k−1 (6.7)
Now, we are ready to characterize the stationary distribution pi(.). In the following
proposition we show that there is a number z∗ ≤ log(2)m/d such that under the stationary
distribution, the size of the pool is highly concentrated in an interval of length O(
√
m/d)
around z∗.
Proposition 6.6. There exists m/(2d+ 1) ≤ k∗ < log(2)m/d such that for any σ > 1,
Ppi
[
k∗ − σ
√
2m/d ≤ Z ≤ k∗ + σ
√
2m/d
]
≥ 1−O(
√
m/d)e−σ
2
.
Proof. Let us define f : R→ R as an interpolation of the difference of transition rates over
the reals,
f(x) := m(1− d/m)x − (x+m(1− (1− d/m)x)).
In particular, observe that f(k) = rk→k+1 − rk→k−1. The above function is a decreasing
convex function over non-negative reals. We define k∗ as the unique root of this function.
Let k∗min := m/(2d+ 1) and k
∗
max := log(2)m/d. We show that f(k
∗
min) ≥ 0 and f(k∗max) ≤ 0.
This shows that k∗min ≤ k∗ < k∗max.
f(k∗min) ≥ −k∗min −m+ 2m(1− d/m)k
∗
min ≥ 2m
(
1− k
∗
mind
m
)
− k∗min = 0,
f(k∗max) ≤ −k∗max −m+ 2m(1− d/m)k
∗
max ≤ −k∗max −m+ 2me−(k
∗
max)d/m = −k∗max ≤ 0.
In the first inequality we used equation (A.4).
It remains to show that pi is highly concentrated around k∗. We prove this in several
steps
Claim 6.7. For any integer k ≥ k∗
pi(k + 1)
pi(k)
≤ e−(k−k∗)d/m.
And, for any k ≤ k∗, pi(k − 1)/pi(k) ≤ e−(k∗−k+1)d/m.
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Proof. For k ≥ k∗, by (6.5), (6.6), (6.7),
pi(k)
pi(k + 1)
=
(k + 1) +m(1− (1− d/m)k+1)
m(1− d/m)k =
k − k∗ + 1−m(1− d/m)k+1 + 2m(1− d/m)k∗
m(1− d/m)k
where we used the definition of k∗. Therefore,
pi(k)
pi(k + 1)
≥ −(1− d/m) + 2
(1− d/m)k−k∗ ≥
1
(1− d/m)k−k∗ ≥ e
−(k−k∗)d/m
where the last inequality uses 1−x ≤ e−x. Multiplying across the inequality yields the claim.
Similarly, we can prove the second conclusion. For k ≤ k∗,
pi(k − 1)
pi(k)
=
k − k∗ −m(1− d/m)k + 2m(1− d/m)k∗
m(1− d/m)k−1
≤ −(1− d/m) + 2(1− d/m)k∗−k+1 ≤ (1− d/m)k∗−k+1 ≤ e−(k∗−k+1)d/m,
where the second to last inequality uses k ≤ k∗.
By repeated application of the above claim, for any integer k ≥ k∗, we get16
pi(k) ≤ pi(k)
pi(dk∗e) ≤ exp
(
− d
m
k−1∑
i=dk∗e
(i− k∗)
)
≤ exp(−d(k − k∗ − 1)2/2m). (6.8)
We are almost done.
For any σ > 0,
∞∑
k=k∗+1+σ
√
2m/d
pi(k) ≤
∞∑
k=k∗+1+σ
√
2m/d
e−d(k−k
∗−1)2/2m =
∞∑
k=0
e−d(k+σ
√
2m/d)2/2m
≤ e
−σ2
min{1/2, σ√d/2m}
The last inequality uses equation (A.1). We can similarly upper bound
∑k∗−σ√2m/d
k=0 pi(k).
The above proposition shows that the probability that the size of the pool falls outside
an interval of length O(
√
m/d) around k∗ drops exponentially fast as the market size grows.
16dk∗e indicates the smallest integer larger than k∗.
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We also remark that the upper bound on k∗ becomes tight as d goes to infinity.
Lemma 6.8. For k∗ as in Proposition 6.6 ,
EZ∼pi [Z] ≤ k∗ +O(
√
m/d log(m/d)).
Proof. Let Let ∆ ≥ 0 be a parameter that we fix later.
EZ∼pi [Z] ≤ k∗ + ∆ +
∞∑
i=k∗+∆+1
ipi(i). (6.9)
By equation (6.8),
∞∑
i=k∗+∆+1
ipi(i) =
∞∑
i=∆+1
e−d(i−1)
2/2m(i+ k∗)
=
∞∑
i=∆
e−di
2/2m(i− 1) +
∞∑
i=∆
e−di
2/2m(k∗ + 2)
≤ e
−d(∆−1)2/2m
d/m
+ (k∗ + 2)
e−d∆
2/2m
min{1/2, d∆/2m} , (6.10)
where we used equations (A.1) and (A.2). Letting ∆ := 1 + 2
√
m/d log(m/d) in the above
equation, the right hand side is at most 1. The lemma follows from (6.9) and the above
equation.
Now, Theorem 6.1. follows immediately by Lemma 6.4 and Lemma 6.8 because we have,
L(Greedy) ≤ 1
m
(k∗ +O(
√
m logm)) ≤ log(2)
d
+ o(1)
6.2 Loss of the Patient Algorithm
Throughout this section we use Zt to denote the size of the pool under Patient. Let pi : N→
R+ be the unique stationary distribution of the Markov Chain on Zt, and let ζ := EZ∼pi [Z]
be the expected size of the pool under that distribution.
By Proposition 5.2, at any point in time Gt is an Erdo¨s-Re´yni random graph. So once an
agent becomes critical, he has at least one acceptable transaction with probability 1− (1−
d/m)Zt−1. Since each agent becomes critical with rate 1, if we run Patient for a sufficiently
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long time, then L(Patient) ≈ ζ(1−d/m)ζ−1. The following lemma makes the above discussion
rigorous.
Lemma 6.9. For any  > 0 and T > 0,
L(Patient) ≤ 1
m
EZ∼pi
[
Z(1− d/m)Z−1]+ τmix()
T
+
m
d2
.
Proof. By linearity of expectation,
L(Patient) =
1
m · T E
[∫ T
t=0
Zt(1− d/m)Zt−1dt
]
=
1
m · T
∫ T
t=0
E
[
Zt(1− d/m)Zt−1
]
dt.
Since for any t ≥ 0, E [Zt(1− d/m)Zt−1] ≤ E [Zt] ≤ E [Z˜t] ≤ m, we can write
L(Patient) ≤ τmix()
T
+
1
m · T
∫ T
t=τmix()
∞∑
i=0
(pi(i) + )i(1− d/m)i−1dt
≤ τmix()
T
+
EZ∼pi
[
Z(1− d/m)Z−1]
m
+
m
d2
where the last inequality uses the identity
∑∞
i=0 i(1− d/m)i−1 = m2/d2.
So in the rest of the proof we just need to lower bound EZ∼pi
[
Z(1− d/m)Z−1]. Similar
to the Greedy case, we do not have a closed form expression for the stationary distribution,
pi(.). Instead, we use the balance equations of the Markov Chain on Zt to show that pi is
highly concentrated around a number k∗ where k∗ ∈ [m/2,m].
Let us start by defining the transition probability operator of the Markov Chain on Zt.
For any pool size k, the Markov Chain transits only to states k + 1, k − 1, or k − 2. The
Markov Chain transits to state k + 1 if a new agent arrives, to the state k − 1 if an agent
gets critical and the the Planner cannot match him, and it transits to state k− 2 if an agent
gets critical and the Planner matches him.
Remember that agents arrive with the rate m, they become critical with the rate of 1 and
the probability of an acceptable transaction between two agents is d/m. Thus, the transition
35
k + 1k k + 2
Figure 5: An illustration of the transition paths of the Zt Markov Chain under the Patient
Algorithm
rates rk→k+1, rk→k−1, and rk→k−2 are defined as follows,
rk→k+1 := m (6.11)
rk→k−1 := k
(
1− d
m
)k−1
(6.12)
rk→k−2 := k
(
1−
(
1− d
m
)k−1)
. (6.13)
Let us write down the balance equation for the above Markov Chain (see equation (5.3)
for the full generality). Consider the cut separating the states 0, 1, 2, . . . , k from the rest (see
Figure 5 for an illustration). It follows that
pi(k)rk→k+1 = pi(k + 1)rk+1→k + pi(k + 1)rk+1→k−1 + pi(k + 2)rk+2→k (6.14)
Now we can characterize pi(.). We show that under the stationary distribution, the size
of the pool is highly concentrated around a number k∗ where k∗ ∈ [m/2,m]. Remember that
under the Greedy algorithm, the concentration was around k∗ ∈ [ m
2d+1
, log(2)m
d
], whereas here
it is at least m/2.
Proposition 6.10 (Patient Concentration). There exists a number m/2− 2 ≤ k∗ ≤ m− 1
such that for any σ ≥ 1,
Ppi
[
k∗ − σ
√
4m ≤ Z
]
≥ 1− 2√me−σ2 , P
[
Z ≤ k∗ + σ
√
4m
]
≥ 1− 8√me− σ
2√m
2σ+
√
m .
Proof. The proof idea is similar to Proposition 6.6. First, let us rewrite (6.14) by replacing
transition probabilities from (6.11), (6.12), and (6.13):
mpi(k) = (k + 1)pi(k + 1) + (k + 2)
(
1−
(
1− d
m
)k+1)
pi(k + 2) (6.15)
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Let us define a continous f : R→ R as follows,
f(x) := m− (x+ 1)− (x+ 2)(1− (1− d/m)x+1). (6.16)
It follows that
f(m− 1) ≤ 0, f(m/2− 2) > 0,
so f(.) has a root k∗ such that m/2− 2 < k∗ < m. In the rest of the proof we show that the
states that are far from k∗ have very small probability in the stationary distribution.
Claim 6.11. For any integer k ≤ k∗,
pi(k)
max{pi(k + 1), pi(k + 2)} ≤ e
−(k∗−k)/m.
Similarly, for any integer k ≥ k∗, min{pi(k+1),pi(k+2)}
pi(k)
≤ e(k−k∗)/(m+k−k∗).
Proof. For k ≤ k∗, by equation (6.15),
pi(k)
max{pi(k + 1), pi(k + 2)} ≤
(k + 1) + (k + 2)(1− (1− d/m)k+1)
m
≤ (k − k
∗) + (k∗ + 1) + (k∗ + 2)(1− (1− d/m)k∗+1)
m
= 1− k
∗ − k
m
≤ e−(k∗−k)/m,
where the last equality follows by the definition of k∗ and the last inequality uses 1−x ≤ e−x.
The second conclusion can be proved similarly. For k ≥ k∗,
min{pi(k + 1), pi(k + 2)}
pi(k)
≤ m
(k + 1) + (k + 2)(1− (1− d/m)k+1)
≤ m
(k − k∗) + (k∗ + 1) + (k∗ + 2)(1− (1− d/m)k∗+1)
=
m
m+ k − k∗ = 1−
k − k∗
m+ k − k∗ ≤ e
−(k−k∗)/(m+k−k∗).
where the equality follows by the definition of k∗.
Now, we use the above claim to upper-bound pi(k) for values k that are far from k∗.
First, fix k ≤ k∗. Let n0, n1, . . . be sequence of integers defined as follows: n0 = k, and
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ni+1 := arg max{pi(ni + 1), pi(ni + 2)} for i ≥ 1. It follows that,
pi(k) ≤
∏
i:ni≤k∗
pi(ni)
pi(ni+1)
≤ exp
(
−
∑
i:ni≤k∗
k∗ − ni
m
)
≤ exp
(
−
(k∗−k)/2∑
i=0
2i
m
)
≤ e−(k∗−k)2/4m,(6.17)
where the second to last inequality uses |ni − ni−1| ≤ 2.
Now, fix k ≥ k∗ + 2. In this case we construct the following sequence of integers,
n0 = bk∗ + 2c, and ni+1 := arg min{pi(ni + 1), pi(ni + 2)} for i ≥ 1. Let nj be the largest
number in the sequence that is at most k (observe that nj = k − 1 or nj = k). We upper-
bound pi(k) by upper-bounding pi(nj),
pi(k) ≤ m · pi(nj)
k
≤ 2
j−1∏
i=0
pi(ni)
pi(ni+1)
≤ 2 exp
(
−
j−1∑
i=0
ni − k∗
m+ ni − k∗
)
≤ 2 exp
(
−
(j−1)/2∑
i=0
2i
m+ k − k∗
)
≤ 2 exp
(−(k − k∗ − 1)2
4(m+ k − k∗)
)
.
(6.18)
To see the first inequality note that if nj = k, then there is nothing to show; otherwise we
have nj = k − 1. In this case by equation (6.15), mpi(k − 1) ≥ kpi(k). The second to last
inequality uses the fact that |ni − ni+1| ≤ 2.
We are almost done. The proposition follows from (6.18) and (6.17). First, for σ ≥ 1, let
∆ = σ
√
4m, then by equation (A.1)
k∗−∆∑
i=0
pi(i) ≤
∞∑
i=∆
e−i
2/4m ≤ e
−∆2/4m
min{1/2,∆/4m} ≤ 2
√
me−σ
2
.
Similarly,
∞∑
i=k∗+∆
pi(i) ≤ 2
∞∑
i=∆+1
e−(i−1)
2/4(i+m) ≤ 2
∞∑
i=∆
e−i/(4+
√
4m/σ)
≤ 2 e
−∆/(4+√4m/σ)
1− e−1/(4+√4m) ≤ 8
√
me
−σ2√m
2σ+
√
m
This completes the proof of Proposition 6.10.
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Lemma 6.12. For any d ≥ 0 and sufficiently large m,
EZ∼pi
[
Z(1− d/m)Z] ≤ max
z∈[m/2,m]
(z + O˜(
√
m))(1− d/m)z + 2.
Proof. Let ∆ := 3
√
m log(m), and let β := maxz∈[m/2−∆,m+∆] z(1− d/m)z.
EZ∼pi
[
Z(1− d/m)Z] ≤ β + m/2−∆−1∑
i=0
m
2
pi(i)(1− d/m)i +
∞∑
i=m+∆
ipi(i)(1− d/m)m (6.19)
We upper bound each of the terms in the right hand side separately. We start with upper
bounding β. Let ∆′ := 4(log(2m) + 1)∆.
β ≤ max
z∈[m/2,m]
z(1− d/m)z +m/2(1− d/m)m/2((1− d/m)−∆ − 1) + (1− d/m)m∆
≤ max
z∈[m/2,m]
(z + ∆′ + ∆)(1− d/m)z + 1. (6.20)
To see the last inequality we consider two cases. If (1 − d/m)−∆ ≤ 1 + ∆′/m then the
inequality obviously holds. Otherwise, (assuming ∆′ ≤ m),
(1− d/m)∆ ≤ 1
1 + ∆′/m
≤ 1−∆′/2m,
By the definition of β,
β ≤ (m+ ∆)(1− d/m)m/2−∆ ≤ 2m(1−∆′/2m)m/2∆−1 ≤ 2me∆′/4∆−1 ≤ 1.
It remains to upper bound the second and the third term in (6.19). We start with the
second term. By Proposition 6.10,
m/2−∆−1∑
i=0
pi(i) ≤ 1
m3/2
. (6.21)
where we used equation (A.1). On the other hand, by equation (6.10),
∞∑
i=m+∆
ipi(i) ≤ e−∆/(2+
√
m)(
m
1− e−1/(2+√m) +
2∆ + 4
1/(2 +
√
m)2
) ≤ 1√
m
. (6.22)
where we used equation (A.3).
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The lemma follows from (6.19), (6.20), (6.21) and (6.22).
Now the proof of Theorem 6.2 follows immediately by combining Lemma 6.9 and Lemma 6.12.
6.3 Loss of the Patient(α) Algorithm
Our idea is to slow down the process and use Theorem 6.2 to analyze the Patient(α) algo-
rithm. More precisely, instead of analyzing Patient(α) algorithm on a (m, d, 1) market we
analyze the Patient algorithm on a (m/α¯, d/α¯, 1) market. First we need to prove a lemma
on the equivalence of markets with different criticality rates.
Definition 6.13 (Market Equivalence). An α-scaling of a dynamic matching market (m, d, λ)
is defined as follows. Given any realization of this market, i.e., given Act , A
n
t , E for any
0 ≤ t ≤ ∞, we construct another realization with the same set of acceptable transactions
and the sets Acα·t, A
n
α·t. We say two dynamic matching markets (m, d, λ) and (m
′, d′, λ′) are
equivalent if one is an α-scaling of the other.
It turns out that for any α ≥ 0, and any time t, any of the Greedy, Patient or Patient(α)
algorithms (and in general any time-scale independent online algorithm) the set of matched
agents at time t of a realization of a (m, d, λ) matching market is the same as the set of
matched agents at time αt of an α-scaling of that realization. The following fact makes this
rigorous.
Proposition 6.14. For any m, d, λ the (m/λ, d/λ, 1) matching market is equivalent to the
(m, d, λ) matching market.
Proof. It turns out that a 1/λ-scaling of the (m, d, λ)-market is exactly the same as the
(m/λ, d/λ, 1) market. In particular, the arrival rate in the scaled market is exactly m/λ, the
criticality rate is 1 and the probability of an acceptable transaction between two agents in
the pool remains unchanged, i.e., d
m
= d/λ
m/λ
.
Now, Theorem 6.3 follows simply by combining the above fact and Theorem 6.2. First,
by the additivity of the Poisson process, the loss of the Patient(α) algorithm in a (m, d, 1)
matching market is equal to the loss of the Patient algorithm in a (m, d, α¯) matching market,
where α¯ = 1/α+1. Second, by the above fact, the loss of the Patient algorithm on a (m, d, α¯)
matching market at time T is the same as the loss of this algorithm on a (m/α¯, d/α¯, 1) market
at time α¯T . The latter is upper-bounded in Theorem 6.2.
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7 Welfare Analysis
Theorem 7.1. For sufficiently large m, any T ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0 and  < 1/2m2,
W(Patient) ≥ 2(T − τmix())
T (δ + 2)
(1− e−d/2(1 + O˜(1/√m)))− 2
T (δ + 2)2
− 3
m
where τmix() ≤ 8 log(m) log(4/). As a corollary, for any α ≥ 0, and α¯ = 1/α + 1,
W(Patient(α)) ≥ 2(α¯T − τmix())
α¯T (δ/α¯ + 2)
(1− e−d/2α¯(1 + O˜(
√
α¯/m)))− 2
α¯T (δ + 2)2
− 3α¯
m
.
Theorem 7.2. If m > 10d, for any T ≥ 0,
W(Greedy) ≤ 1− 1
2d+ 1 + d2/m
.
Say an agent a is arrived at time ta(a). We let Xt be the sum of the potential utility of
the agents in At:
Xt =
∑
a∈At
e−δ(t−ta(a)),
i.e., if we match all of the agents currently in the pool immediately, the total utility that
they receive is exactly Xt.
For t0,  > 0, let Wt0,t0+ be the expected total utility of the agents who are matched in
the interval [t0, t0 + ]. By definition the social welfare of an online algorithm, we have:
W(Patient) = E
[
1
T
∫ T
t=0
Wt,t+dtdt
]
=
1
T
∫ T
t=0
E [Wt,t+dt] dt
7.1 Welfare of the Patient Algorithm
All agents are equally likely to become critical at each moment. From the perspective of
the planner, all agents are equally likely to be the neighbor of a critical agent. Hence, the
expected utility of each of the agents who are matched at time t under the Patient algorithm
is Xt/Zt. Thus,
W(Patient) =
1
mT
∫ T
t=0
E
[
2
Xt
Zt
Zt(1− (1− d/m)Zt)dt
]
=
2
mT
∫ T
t=0
E
[
Xt(1− (1− d/m)Zt)
]
dt
(7.1)
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First, we prove the following claim.
Lemma 7.3. For any  < 1/2m2, and t ≥ τmix(),
E
[
Xt(1− (1− d/m)Zt)
] ≥ E [Xt](1− 3
m
− e−d/2(1 + 4 log
2m√
m
)
)
− 1√
m
Proof. Let β := m/2− σ√4m for σ ≥ 1 that we fix later. First, observe that
E
[
Xt(1− (1− d/m)Zt)
] ≥ E [Xt(1− (1− d/m)Zt|Zt ≥ β] · P [Zt ≥ β]
≥ E [Xt|Zt ≥ β]P [Zt ≥ β] (1− (1− d/m)β) (7.2)
On the other hand,
E [Xt|Zt ≥ β] ≥ E [Xt]− E [Xt|Zt < β]P [Zt < β] ≥ E [Xt]− β · P [Zt < β] (7.3)
where we used that conditioned on Zt ≤ β we have Xt ≤ β with probability 1. Let σ =√
2 log(2m). Since t ≥ τmix(), using Proposition 6.10,
P [Zt ≥ β] ≥ 1−
√
me−σ
2 −  ≥ 1− 1/m−3/2.
Putting above together, we get
E
[
Xt(1− (1− d/m)Zt
] ≥ (E [Xt]−m−1/2)(1−m−3/2)(1− (1− d/m)m/2
(1− d/m)σ√4m
)
≥ E [Xt]
(
1− 3
m
− e−d/2(1 + 4 log
2m√
m
)
)
− 1√
m
To see the last equation we need to consider two cases. Let ∆ := 4 log(m)σ
√
4m. Now, if
(1− d
m
)−σ
√
4m ≤ 1 + ∆/m, then
1− (1− d/m)m/2−σ
√
4m ≥ 1− e−d/2(1 + ∆/m).
Otherwise, for sufficiently large m, (1− d/m)σ
√
4m ≤ 1−∆/2m. So,
1− (1− d/m)m/2−σ
√
4m ≥ 1− (1−∆/2m) m2σ√4m−1 ≥ 1− e− log(m)+∆/2m ≤ 1− 2/m.
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Let  < 1/2m2. By above lemma, we have:
W(Patient) ≥ 2
mT
∫ T
t=τmix()
(
E [Xt]
(
1− 3
m
− e−d/2(1 + 4 log
2m√
m
)
)
− 1√
m
)
(7.4)
It remains to lower-bound E [Xt]. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 7.4. For any t1 ≥ 0,
E [Xt1 ] ≥
m
δ + 2
(1− e−(δ+2)t1)
Proof. Let  > 0 and be very close to zero (eventually we let  → 0). Since we have a
(m, d, 1) matching market, using equation (5.1) for any t ≥ 0 we have,
E [Xt+|Xt, Zt] = Xt(e−δ) +m− Zt
(Xt
Zt
(1− d/m)Zt
)
− 2Zt
(Xt
Zt
(1− (1− d/m)Zt)
)
±O(2)
The first term in the RHS follows from the exponential discount in the utility of the agents
in the pool. The second term in the RHS stands for the new arrivals. The third term stands
for the perished agents and the last term stands for the the matched agents.
We use the e−x ≥ 1− x inequality and rearrange the equation to get,
E [Xt+|Xt, Zt] ≥ m+Xt − Xt(δ + 2)−O(2).
Taking expectation from both sides of the above inequality we get,
E [Xt+]− E [Xt]

≥ m− (δ + 2)E [Xt]−O()
Letting → 0, and solving the above differential equation for t1 we get
E [Xt1 ] ≥
m
δ + 2
(1− e−(δ+2)t1).
we used the fact that E [X0] = 0.
By the above lemma,
W(Patient) ≥ 2
mT
∫ T
t=τmix()
m
δ + 2
(1− e−(δ+2)t)
(
1− e−d/2(1 + 4 log
2m√
m
)
)
dt− 3
m
≥ 2(T − τmix())
T (δ + 2)
(1− e−d/2(1 + O˜(1/√m))− 2
T (δ + 2)2
− 3
m
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7.2 Welfare of the Greedy Algorithm
Here, we upper-bound the welfare of the optimum online algorithm, OPT, and that imme-
diately upper-bounds the welfare of the Greedy algorithm. Recall that by Theorem 4.1, for
any T >, 1/(2d + 1 + d2/m) fraction of the agents perish in OPT. On the other hand, by
definition of utility, we receive a utility at most 1 from any matched agent. Therefore, even
if all of the matched agents receive a utility of 1, (for any δ ≥ 0)
W(Greedy) ≤W(OPT) ≤ 1− 1
2d+ 1 + d2/m
.
8 Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms
In this section we design a dynamic mechanism to elicit the departure times of agents. As
alluded to in Subsection 3.4, we assume that agents only have statistical knowledge about
the market: That is, each agent knows the market parameters, m,d,1, and the details of the
dynamic mechanism that the market-maker is executing. But no agent knows the actual
instantiation of the probability space.
Each agent a chooses a mixed strategy, that is she reports getting critical at an infinitesi-
mal time [t, t+dt] with rate ca(t)dt. In other words, each agent a has a clock that ticks with
rate ca(t) at time t and she reports criticality when the clock ticks. We assume each agent’s
strategy function, ca(.) is well-behaved, i.e., it is non-negative, continuously differentiable
and continuously integrable. Note that since the agent can only observe the parameters of
the market ca(.) can depend on any parameter in our model but this function is constant in
different sample paths of the stochastic process.
A strategy profile C is a vector of well-behaved functions for each agent in the market,
that is, C = [ca]a∈A. For an agent a and a strategy profile C, let E [uC(a)] be the expected
utility of a under the strategy profile C. Note that for any C, a, 0 ≤ E [uC(a)] ≤ 1. Given a
strategy profile C = [ca]a∈A, let C − ca + c˜a denote a strategy profile same as C but for agent
a who is playing c˜a rather than ca. The following definition introduces our solution concept.
Definition 8.1. A strategy profile C is an -mixed strategy Nash equilibrium if for any agent
a and any well-behaved function c˜a(.),
1− E [uC(a)] ≤ (1 + )(1− E [uC−ca+c˜a ]).
44
Note that the solution concept we are introducing here is different from the usual defi-
nitions of an -Nash equilibrium, where the condition is either E [uC(a)] ≥ E [uC−ca+c˜a ] − ,
or E [uC(a)] ≥ (1 − )E [uC−ca+c˜a ]. The reason that we are using 1 − E [uC(a)] as a measure
of distance is because we know that under Patient(α) algorithm, E [uC(a)] is very close to 1,
and so 1 − E [uC(a)] is a “lower-order term”. Therefore, by this definition, we are restrict-
ing ourself to a stronger equilibrium concept, which requires us to show that in equilibrium
agents cannot increase neither their utilities, nor the lower-order terms associates with their
utilities by a factor more than .
Throughout this section let k∗ ∈ [m/2 − 2,m − 1] be the root of (6.16) as defined in
Proposition 6.10, and let β := (1 − d/m)k∗ . In this section we show that if δ (the discount
factor) is no more than β, then the strategy vectors ca(t) = 0 for all agents a and t is a
-mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for  very close to zero. In other words, if all other agents
are truthful, an agent’s utility from being truthful is almost as large as any other strategy.
Theorem 8.2. If the market is at stationary and δ ≤ β, then ca(t) = 0 for all a, t is an
O(d4 log3(m)/
√
m)-mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for Patient-Mechanism(∞).
By our market equivalence result (Proposition 6.14), Theorem 8.2 leads to the following
corollary.
Corollary 8.3. Let α¯ = 1/α+ 1 and β(α) = α¯(1− d/m)m/α¯. If the market is at stationary
and δ ≤ β(α), then ca(t) = 0 for all a, t is an O((d/α¯)4 log3(m/α¯)/
√
m/α¯)-mixed strategy
Nash equilibrium for Patient-Mechanism(α).
The proof of the above theorem is involved but the basic idea is very easy. If an agent
reports getting critical at the time of arrival she will receive a utility of 1− β. On the other
hand, if she is truthful (assuming δ = 0) she will receive about 1 − β/2. In the course of
the proof we show that by choosing any strategy vector c(.) the expected utility of an agent
interpolates between these two number, so it is maximized when she is truthful.
Lemma 8.4. Let Z0 be at stationary and suppose a enters the market at time 0. If δ < β,
and 10d4 log3(m) ≤ √m, then for any well-behaved function c(.),
E [uc(a)] ≤ O
(
d4 log3(m)/
√
m
)
β +
2(1− β)
2− β + δ ,
We prove the lemma by first to writing a closed form expression for the utility of a and
then upper-bounding that expression. We start by studying the expected gain of a in a tiny
interval [t, t+ ].
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In the following claim we study the probability a is matched in the interval [t, t+ ] and
the probability that it leaves the market in that interval.
Claim 8.5. For any time t ≥ 0, and  > 0,
P [a ∈Mt,t+] =  · P [a ∈ At] (2 + c(t))E
[
1− (1− d/m)Zt − 1|a ∈ At
]±O(2) (8.1)
P [a /∈ At+, a ∈ At] = P [a ∈ At] (1− (1 + c(t) + E
[
1− (1− d/m)Zt−1|a ∈ At
]
)±O(2))
(8.2)
Proof. The claim follows from two simple observations. First, a becomes critical in the
interval [t, t + ] with probability  · P [a ∈ At] (1 + c(t)) and if he is critical he is matched
with probability E
[
(1− (1− d/m)Zt−1|a ∈ At
]
. Second, a may also get matched (without
getting critical) in the interval [t, t + ]. Observe that if an agent b ∈ At where b 6= a gets
critical she will be matched with a with probability 1− (1− d/m)Zt−1/(Zt − 1),. Therefore,
the probability that a is matched at [t, t+ ] without getting critical is
P [a ∈ At] · E
[
 · (Zt − 1)1− (1− d/m)
Zt−1
Zt − 1 |a ∈ At
]
=  · P [a ∈ At]E
[
1− (1− d/m)Zt−1|a ∈ At
]
The claim follows from simple algebraic manipulations.
We need to study the conditional expectation E
[
1− (1− d/m)Zt−1|a ∈ At
]
to use the
above claim. This is not easy in general; although the distribution of Zt remains stationary,
the distribution of Zt conditioned on a ∈ At can be a very different distribution. So,
here we prove simple upper and lower bounds on E
[
1− (1− d/m)Zt−1|a ∈ At
]
using the
concentration properties of Zt. By the assumption of the lemma Zt is at stationary at any
time t ≥ 0. Let k∗ be the number defined in Proposition 6.10, and β = (1 − d/m)k∗ . Let
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σ :=
√
6 log(8m/β). By Proposition 6.10, for any t ≥ 0,
E
[
1− (1− d/m)Zt−1|a ∈ At
] ≤ E [1− (1− d/m)Zt−1|Zt < k∗ + σ√4m, a ∈ At]
+ P
[
Zt ≥ k∗ + σ
√
4m|a ∈ At
]
≤ 1− (1− d/m)k∗+σ
√
4m +
P
[
Zt ≥ k∗ + σ
√
4m
]
P [a ∈ At]
≤ 1− β + β(1− (1− d/m)σ
√
4m) +
8
√
me−σ
2/3
P [a ∈ At]
≤ 1− β + 2σdβ√
m
+
β
m2 · P [a ∈ At] (8.3)
In the last inequality we used (A.4) and the definition of σ. Similarly,
E
[
1− (1− d/m)Zt−1|a ∈ At
] ≥ E [1− (1− d/m)Zt−1|Zt ≥ k∗ − σ√4m, a ∈ At]
· P
[
Zt ≥ k∗ − σ
√
4m|a ∈ At
]
≥ (1− (1− d/m)k∗−σ
√
4m)
P [a ∈ At]− P
[
Zt < k
∗ − σ√4m]
P [a ∈ At]
≥ 1− β − β((1− d/m)−σ
√
4m − 1)− 2
√
me−σ
2
P [a ∈ At]
≥ 1− β − 4dσβ√
m
− β
3
m3 · P [a ∈ At] (8.4)
where in the last inequality we used (A.4), the assumption that 2dσ ≤ √m and the definition
of σ.
Next, we write a closed form upper-bound for P [a ∈ At]. Choose t∗ such that
∫ t∗
t=0
(2 +
c(t))dt = 2 log(m/β). Observe that t∗ ≤ log(m/β) ≤ σ2/6. Since a leaves the market with
rate at least 1 + c(t) and at most 2 + c(t), we can write
β2
m2
= exp
(
−
∫ t∗
t=0
(2 + c(t))dt
)
≤ P [a ∈ At∗ ] ≤ exp
(
−
∫ t∗
t=0
(1 + c(t))dt
)
≤ β
m
(8.5)
Intuitively, t∗ is a moment where the expected utility of that a receives in the interval [t∗,∞)
is negligible, i.e., in the best case it is at most β/m.
47
By Claim 8.5 and (8.4), for any t ≤ t∗,
P [a ∈ At+]− P [a ∈ At]

≤ −P [a ∈ At]
(
2 + c(t)− β − 4dσβ√
m
− β
3
m3 · P [a ∈ At] ±O()
)
≤ −P [a ∈ At]
(
2 + c(t)− β − 5dσβ√
m
±O()
)
where in the last inequality we used (8.5). Letting  → 0, for t ≤ t∗, the above differential
equation yields,
P [a ∈ At] ≤ exp
(
−
∫ t
τ=0
(
2+c(τ)−β− 5dσβ√
m
)
dτ
)
≤ exp
(
−
∫ t
τ=0
(2+c(τ)−β)dτ
)
+
2dσ3β√
m
.
(8.6)
where in the last inequality we used t∗ ≤ σ2/6, ex ≤ 1+2x for x ≤ 1 and lemma’s assumption
5dσ2 ≤ √m .
Now, we are ready to upper-bound the utility of a. By (8.5) the expected utility that a
gains after t∗ is no more than β/m. Therefore,
E [uc(a)] ≤ β
m
+
∫ t∗
t=0
(2 + c(t))E
[
1− (1− d/m)Zt−1|a ∈ At
]
P [a ∈ At] e−δtdt
≤ β
m
+
∫ t∗
t=0
(2 + c(t))((1− β)P [a ∈ At] + β/
√
m)e−δtdt
≤ β
m
+
∫ t∗
t=0
(2 + c(t))
(
(1− β) exp
(
−
∫ t
τ=0
(2 + c(τ)− β)dτ
)
+
3dσ3√
m
β
)
e−δtdt
≤ 2dσ
5
√
m
β +
∫ ∞
t=0
(1− β)(2 + c(t)) exp
(
−
∫ t
τ=0
(2 + c(τ)− β)dτ
)
e−δtdt.
In the first inequality we used equation (8.3), in second inequality we used equation (8.6),
and in the last inequality we use the definition of t∗. We have finally obtained a closed form
upper-bound on the expected utility of a.
Let Uc(a) be the right hand side of the above equation. Next, we show that Uc(a) is
maximized by letting c(t) = 0 for all t. This will complete the proof of Lemma 8.4. Let c
be a function that maximizes Uc(a) which is not equal to zero. Suppose c(t) 6= 0 for some
t ≥ 0. We define a function c˜ : R+ → R+ and we show that if δ < β, then Uc˜(a) > Uc(a).
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Let c˜ be the following function,
c˜(τ) =

c(τ) if τ < t,
0 if t ≤ τ ≤ t+ ,
c(τ) + c(τ − ) if t+  ≤ τ ≤ t+ 2,
c(τ) otherwise.
In words, we push the mass of c(.) in the interval [t, t+ ] to the right. We remark that the
above function c˜(.) is not necessarily continuous so we need to smooth it out. The latter
can be done without introducing any errors and we do not describe the details here. Let
S :=
∫ t
τ=0
(1 + c(t) + β)dτ . Assuming c˜′(t) 1/, we have
Uc˜(a)− Uc(a) ≥ − · c(t)(1− β)e−Se−δt +  · c(t)(1− β)e−S−(2−β)e−δ(t+)
+(1− β)(2 + c(t+ ))(e−S−(2−β)e−δ(t+) − e−S−(2+c(t)−β)e−δ(t+))
= −2 · c(t)(1− β)e−S−δt(2− β + δ) + 2(1− β)(2 + c(t+ ))e−S−δtc(t)
≥ 2 · (1− β)e−S−δtc(t)(β − δ).
Since δ < β by the lemma’s assumption, the maximizer of Uc(a) is the all zero function.
Therefore, for any well-behaved function c(.),
E [uc(a)] ≤ 2dσ
5
√
m
β +
∫ ∞
t=0
2(1− β) exp
(
−
∫ t
τ=0
(2− β)dτ
)
e−δtdt
≤ O(d
4 log3(m)√
m
)β +
2(1− β)
2− β + δ .
In the last inequality we used that σ = O(
√
log(m/β)) and β ≤ e−d. This completes the
proof of Lemma 8.4.
The proof of Theorem 8.2 follows simply from the above analysis.
Proof of Theorem 8.2. All we need to do is to lower-bound the expected utility of an agent
a if she is truthful. We omit the details as they are essentially similar. So, if all agents are
truthful,
E [u(a)] ≥ 2(1− β)
2− β + δ −O
(d4 log3(m)√
m
)
β.
This shows that the strategy vector corresponding to truthful agents is anO(d4 log3(m)/
√
m)-
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.
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9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we developed a new framework to model dynamic matching markets. This
paper innovates by accounting for stochastic departures and analyzing the problem under a
variety of information conditions. Rather than modeling market thickness via a fixed match-
function, it explicitly accounts for the network structure that affects the Planner’s options.
This allows market thickness to emerge as an endogenous phenomenon, responsive to the
underlying constraints.
There are many real market design problems where the timing of transactions must be
decided by a policymaker. These include paired kidney exchanges, dating agencies, and
online labor markets such as oDesk. In such markets, policymakers face a trade-off between
the speed of transactions and the thickness of the market. It is natural to ask, “Does it
matter when transactions occur? How much does it matter?” The first insight of this paper
is that waiting to thicken the market can yield substantial welfare gains, and this result is
quite robust to the presence of waiting costs.
The second insight of this paper relates to optimization. Because our approach takes
seriously the network structure of the planner’s constraints, the resulting Markov decision
process is combinatorially complex, and not tractable via standard dynamic programming
methods. Surprisingly, we find that na¨ıve local algorithms with different waiting properties
can come close to optimal benchmarks that exploit the whole graph structure.
The third insight of this paper is that information and waiting time are complements;
even short-horizon information about agents’ departure times yields large gains that can be
exploited by simple waiting algorithms. When the urgency of individual cases is private
information, we exhibit a mechanism without transfers that elicits such information from
sufficiently patient agents.
These results suggest that the dimension of time is a first-order concern in many matching
markets, with welfare implications that static models do not capture. They also suggest
that policymakers would reap large gains from acquiring timing information about agent
departures, such as by paying for predictive diagnostic testing or monitoring agents’ outside
options.
A key technical contribution of this paper is that we show how to characterize dynamic
matching markets as analytically tractable Markov processes. We develop new techniques to
prove concentration bounds on stochastic processes; in particular, to show that for a large
t, a given function is concentrated in an interval whose size does not depend on t. These
enable us to deliver analytic comparisons of different algorithms, even when their stationary
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distributions do not have simple closed-form characterizations. We hope these techniques
are helpful to other researchers interested in dynamic matching problems.
We suggest some promising extensions. First, one could generalize the model to allow
multiple types of agents, with the probability of an acceptable transaction differing across
type-pairs. This could capture settings where certain agents are known ex ante to be less
likely to have acceptable trades than other agents, as is the case for patients with high Panel
Reactive Antibody (PRA) scores in paired kidney exchanges. The multiple-types framework
also contains bipartite markets as a special case.
Second, one could adopt more gradual assumptions about agent departure processes;
agents could have a range of individual states with state-dependent perishing rates, and an
independent process specifying transition rates between states. Our model, in which agents
transition to a critical state at rate λ and then perish imminently, is a limit case of the
multiple-states framework.
Third, it would be interesting to enrich the space of preferences in the model, such as
by allowing matches to yield a range of payoffs. We conjecture that this would reinforce
our existing results, since waiting to thicken the market could allow planners to make better
matches, in addition to increasing the size of the matching. Further insights may come by
making explicit the role of price in dynamic matching markets. It is not obvious how to do
so, but similar extensions have been made for static models [KJC82, HM05], and the correct
formulation may seem obvious in retrospect.
Much remains to be done in the theory of dynamic matching. As market design expands
its reach, re-engineering markets from the ground up, economists will increasingly have to
answer questions about the timing and frequency of transactions. Many dynamic matching
markets have important features (outlined above) that we have not modeled explicitly. We
offer this paper as a step towards systematically understanding matching problems that take
place across time.
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A Auxiliary Inequalities
In this section we prove several inequalities that are used throughout the paper. For any
a, b ≥ 0,
∞∑
i=a
e−bi
2
=
∞∑
i=0
e−b(i+a)
2 ≤
∞∑
i=0
e−ba
2−2iab = e−ba
2
∞∑
i=0
(e−2ab)i
=
e−ba
2
1− e−2ab ≤
e−ba
2
min{ab, 1/2} . (A.1)
The last inequality can be proved as follows: If 2ab ≤ 1, then e−2ab ≤ ab, otherwise e−2ab ≤
1/2.
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For any a, b ≥ 0,
∞∑
i=a
(i− 1)e−bi2 ≤
∫ ∞
a−1
xe−bx
2
dx =
−1
2b
e−bx
2 |∞a−1=
e−b(a−1)
2
2b
. (A.2)
For any a ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ b ≤ 1,
∞∑
i=a
ie−bi = e−ba
∞∑
i=0
(i+ a)e−bi = e−ba
( a
1− e−b +
1
(1− e−b)
)
≤ e
−ba(2ba+ 4)
b2
. (A.3)
The Bernoulli inequality states that for any x ≤ 1, and any n ≥ 1,
(1− x)n ≥ 1− xn. (A.4)
Here, we prove for integer n. The above equation can be proved by a simple induction on n.
It trivially holds for n = 0. Assuming it holds for n we can write,
(1− x)n+1 = (1− x)(1− x)n ≥ (1− x)(1− xn) = 1− x(n+ 1) + x2n ≥ 1− x(n+ 1).
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